STABLES: Vote on this slate of 3 topics on the google document.

[passes unanimously]

STABLES: Thanks to the committee for all your work. You only get recognized when things go wrong. I don’t do the page counts, but it’s been a tremendous amount of work, and it’s so appreciated. Thanks especially to Ryan and Greta who are cycling off the committee in the next few months. Does anyone want my job? Because I’m happy to do it but I’m also happy to give it up if anyone wants me out.

[no]

GALLOWAY: Big thanks to Gordon, who puts up w/ a lot and does an incredible amount of work.

after substance-neutral grammatical edits, topic #3 is up for review on google docs

STABLES: Are there other questions about approach 2?

SMITH: I thought you didn't want a unilateral one? Is there int'l language in there?

ATCHISON: I also have that question.

ARNETT: I will say if you add multilateral, it helps the aff, but I don't know...

SMITH: It doesn't hurt to make your 9-0 explicit.

STAHL: I don't know if it fully rectifies the concern. I think Arnett's concern as stated related to restriction is that int'l stuff is not an on face a restriction. Saying through unilateral or international means would not fix the restriction.

LACY: That still applies more to the topic as written.

ARNETT: Why not allow the debate?

MANCUSO: That's a compromise.

ARNETT: Why is the debate bad?

SMITH: Because allowing the aff to be int'l is good. The aff shouldn't be stuck w/ unilateral. So creating debates to undo that is bad. We should be debating about what we want to be debating about.

KUSWA: The T debate will be better than that -- what kind of multilateral action? Tacking it on doesn't solve...

SMITH: You're right. It's partial solvency. In one debate, the aff can say the topic specifically authorizes int'l. In another, they can't.

ARNETT: Adding int'l explicitly has the aff at freedom. Adding multilateralism gives them some ground.

SMITH: They worked long and hard on the wording and came up w/ "international initiatives." People are gonna say, hey, this middle one doesn't say you can do negotiate. It says the USFG should restrict, not some int'l agreement should restrict.

MANCUSO: Of course, size only need be reduced. Plenty of the international policies are size-related.

BELLON: I think this problem is just as possible w/ the explicit element. Even entering into an agreement might be an on-face reduction. If that's true, the explicit part isn't necessary. If it isn't, the explicit part runs into all the trouble of the list topic.

SMITH: Maybe we all agree that since the topic doesn't say how you reduce, you're allowed to reduce through either. Greta is very good at arguing that our community tends to vote in practical T debates for the more limiting interpretation, time after time, and so people will say there's more than one way to read this. Yes, it could be read as multilateral, but it's narrower if it's only unilateral, so that should be the controlling interpretation.

ARNETT: Let me make an argument for democracy. Let the debates happen b/c if the community really wants int'l, that's how it'll be interpreted.

GONZO: Let me make an argument against democracy. It breaks down over time, given the way that topicality plays out.

KUSWA: The words still matter. We've had all these debates about role and mission, and they can be defined to benefit the community.

BELLON: If that is your concern, remember that whatever words we add on to the topic will have the same problem. If you chose to do int'l, you risk being stuck w/ what your partner says.

MANCUSO: If put int'l at the end, it will control how it's interpreted. What else could they have possibly meant?

STAHL: I think would be true except that you can prove that there are int'l cases which are restrictions. If you think the CTBT reduces the role the nuclear weapons, I don't think the wording at the end would make any difference.

ARNETT: I agree 100%. In the small direction it might make a difference, I think it should go neg b/c a lot of people want to have those debates.

[motion to add the phrase fails 6-3]

MANCUSO: Do we think we need "its nuclear weapons arsenal" in there twice?

STAHL: I think it reads more clearly.

MANCUSO: I'm not sure. It seems ignorant to me.

STAHL: I think removing it creates ambiguity about the verbs.

MANCUSO: Yeah, that's a substantive concern.

[topic #2 passes]

MANCUSO: We got feedback from Josh Hoe that the committee is not very sensitive to the issues of negative ground on int'l negotiation. The topic paper authors didn't say much about the neg ground on int'l action. Do we want to present an option on the ballot that is closer to the topic paper and gives them just unilateral action?

STAHL: I think Josh's understanding is a misreading of the topic paper. At one point it even promises the Russia topic paper w/o the baggage.

MANCUSO: I can't disagree with that. What's the generic neg ground?

STAHL: You still get the deterrence DA.

GONZO: You still get the deterrence DA. The other really important thing is that if there is insufficient neg ground against int'l affs, that simply means there is no aff ground against int'l neg CPs. Some of the best arguments on treaties were Russia cheats, etc. We should give this ground back to the affirmative.

STABLES: Article after article in the topic paper speaks to bilateral and multilateral possibilities.

ARNETT: I think the T argument I talked about w/ topic #1 is much stronger here. I don't know how negotiating something restricts the role and/or mission?

HESTER: By entering a negotiation where other countries will have a say, that does restrict our arsenal. Some types of negotiation would be topical and some wouldn't. Ultimately the aff would be bound to be doing something; they get to say unilateral sucks.

SMITH: If you don't get to have some involvement w/ other countries, the whole tactical issue w/ NATO, toss that out...

KUSWA: Look at the list of 10 items; they call for negotiations.

STABLES: So it's now a question of roles or missions or both?

[nods around the room]

KEENAN: If I pass an amendment restricting the role of the CEDA President from hosting the CEDA tournament or one restricting roles of the CEDA President from hosting the tournament, hosting the topic meeting, etc., what's the difference?

MANCUSO: In the plural sense, those are the missions of the CEDA President. So if you wanna put roles in there, ok, but you're not getting rid of the boogeyman of singular mission affs. Plus, roles plural will get neg args that roles mean things like "deterrence and assurance," which is bad for the aff especially when you want to link turn the DAs.

KEENAN: I still think it's a collective noun.

STABLES: Role, missions, or both?

KEENAN: You can't REDUCE a singular role.

STAHL: There is evidence talking about "reducing the role."

KUSWA: Tons.

HESTER: All the weapons have the same role of deterrence but done in different ways. If you restrict that role from going to submarines, it's restricted from THAT task. Even plural roles stays generally broad, I think, unlike missions.

MANCUSO: If roles are pluralized, how do you restrict them from small things like Smolensk? At least with missions, when they read their deterrence link turns, the neg says you're no longer topical.

HESTER: Not all deterrence is the same. They mean US deterrence, not necessarily nuclear deterrence.

STABLES: Are we gonna try this again? Three options.

[A vote occurs -- no option gets a majority]

[vote again, the option for both roles and missions wins]

FITZMIER: Do de-alerting and the like fulfill disarmament commitments?

GALLOWAY: According to the 13 steps.

STAHL: This is what this topic is. This is what we decided what it is.

HESTER: I think it's not perfectly clear what's in or out, but I agree w/ Greta that this is what this topic is. I would consider moving "substantial" to the commitment.

STABLES: There is some contextual evidence about "substantial changes to the nuclear posture." What limiting function exists is the difference between the status quo and the plan.

STAHL: Let's vote on this topic and moving on.

STABLES: All in favor of adding topic #1 to the ballot.

[most or all of the committee]

[on to topic #2]

GALLOWAY: We developed three ways of looking at this, pending Josh Hoe's commentary from yesterday and mission/role/size.

What is topical? It questionably includes FMCT. Having that debate might not be bad; it is certainly not ironclad for the aff.

"reduce"/"restrict": Thornton refers to START I -- the US and Soviet Union moved to "reduce and restrict." The size of the arsenal and the binding nature of it are both there. It is in the arms control literature, and it is close to a term of art. The addition of "restrict" was very strong in this capacity. It forces a binding cap on the aff to some degree, and "reduce" stops us from freezing the status quo.

Ed Lee was the man, as always, in suggesting "international" instead of "bilateral and multilateral." See why those terms are inadequate on pgs 7,8,9, maybe more. "International negotiations" is used. Whether we want to include that is different from whether we can. Josh Hoe wrote in to say we should have a unilateral topic.

Kevin e-mailed me some cards, saying "initiatives" is better than "policies." Policies are often larger, and initiatives often take the action. "Initiatives" also allows debate about Russia and China; reciprocal cuts are initiatives. "Policies" might prohibit small specific necessary actions.

Why different from other resolutions?

1. It restricts. Not substantial change.

2. You have to reduce. Substantial change may not require that.

3. "Mission" and "role" create great T defenses from the FAS document or Kevin's 10 items card.

4. It does not necessarily allow FMCT.

5. People may like the cases of this topic more. Posture debates can be esoteric and separate from the public, unlike debates about deterrence and role.

We are only looking for one ballot option.

KUSWA: We don't need the last clause on international negotiations. It's pretty clear from "role" and "mission" evidence that negotiation is included. To restrict "role" and "mission" allows that.

We wanted to maintain choice regarding role and mission. I feel strongly that role is better than mission, but I would be very happy with a topic that only dealt with missions.

I prefer 2.1A but have a feeling we will go with 2.1B.

FITZMIER: I have a question about "reduce and restrict." I think it poses counterplan difficulties for the aff. Nasty PICs come out of affs that can be solved by reduction and an additional mission competes against restrict.

GALLOWAY: It may compete, but I don't know if it solves the case.

LACY: I don't know if you can fix it by "reduce and/or restrict."

SOMEONE: That goes back to the only restrict issue.

GONZO: As I understand it, reductions in the past have only meant that warheads be downloaded from the weapons into a nuclear hedge or something similar. The neg could hedge warheads like normal, and it competes against restriction.

GALLOWAY: I disagree with the point that we have always done it. I don't know when we've done it w/o reduction and restriction, reading our evidence about START I.

There are two different arguments. If restrict is not in here, the problem is that my aff can build up conventional weapons or the RRW. That may be a bit of a pick-a-poison thing. There seemed to be a growing consensus that increase conventional weapons is not in the topic.

STAHL: Is restrict in there for the role part or for the size part as well?

GALLOWAY: Both I think, but we could entertain that notion.

LACY: Can we go through the checklist and see which must reduce and restrict?

FITZMIER: Take unilateral cuts. What's the aff's defense against reduction?

KUSWA: You're just talking about the size part? First of all, there's an earlier problem that if you only reduce the size, you could mean the size of the weapons, thus the word "arsenal." An aff that only deals with the size part can say the words are synonymous.

SMITH: I thought restrict started w/ Steve's point that it got some legally binding value.

STAHL: I'm not sure how you can reduce the size of the arsenal and have it play out that way.

SMITH: Does restrict cap the role? If I add a role to shoot asteroids out of the sky, that competes? I discover lots of new roles; does the aff have to cap the number of roles?

GALLOWAY: My answer begs my understanding of CTBT. CTBT allows testing for the purposes you define. How can a treaty that legally binds testing not restrict?

LACY: Like the energy topic, a cap could be dangerous.

GALLOWAY: I am concerned about the idea, especially with role, that restrict is not in there. I am worried about RRW and conventional weapons reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

ATCHISON: Is the following aff T: Drastic cuts that lead to new bunker busters? Have I restricted the arsenal?

GALLOWAY: I see 2 questions here. First, could you decrease the size of our arsenal and lead to better weapons? You could claim that as an aff. I can't see why you couldn't.

Second, I think you do have to have a legal restriction on the size of the arsenal. The way it's written right now, I think that's true.

LACY: Aff says we meet, reduce and restrict missions. Neg says CP new mission to nuke the moon.

GALLOWAY: The cap in terms of role might be less than the cap in terms of this. We have restricted the missions that currently exist...

LACY: The 2AC starts with "we meet restrict missions"...

MANCUSO: If the plan said ban counterforce missions, I don't think they have to ban all missions. If you want to CP w/ a new counterforce mission, go ahead. But if you come up w/ a new countervalue mission, I don't think the aff has to cap globally.

STAHL: Is there a downside to splitting it up? Some of us seem to have concerns about reduce and restrict size and perhaps lesser concerns about role.

GALLOWAY: I'm moving towards that friendly amendment.

STAHL: I'm not sure an aff that spurs new weapons is not T b/c it does not restrict size. I have no problem w/ the effects of deep cuts affs that spur weapons.

SMITH: Here's the problem. You have to reduce the size and cap the arsenal, the whole thing. Secondly, it's reduce and restrict the missions, which either means you have to do at least 2 or it means the set. If we took out missions, it's reduce and restrict the role, that there's this one role that you have to restrict, which makes any CP that adds to that compete.

GALLOWAY: Does this solve your concern? Reduce and restrict a role? One of the concerns about missions and role is that one is plural and one is singular.

MANCUSO: I disagree with the idea that restricting one part of it restricts the whole thing. If I said, we're not going to shoot any missiles at Asia.

STAHL: If the wording was we have to reduce the number of targets...

MANCUSO: I see what you're saying about size.

LACY: If the topic says reduce the colors in the box, you still have a box of 64.

GALLOWAY: I'd like to move on the issue of removing restrict when it refers to size.

STABLES: Using which as a starting point?

GALLOWAY: 2.1B

MANCUSO: We're not using missions?

GONZO: I have two questions. One, Ryan, is there an explicit reason for making missions plural and role singular?

[Galloway says roughly that role = deterrence and missions = the things they do]

KUSWA: The evidence on missions from the FAS talks about individualized missions. Role is singular b/c the evidence is talking about overarching role, and the question is whether your change is substantial compared to THE role. I think it would be even better if we made a choice between role and missions. Size we keep and has been addressed by using reduce.

GONZO: I worry if we define a singular role, restrict it implies a cap. There's a difference between restricting as a cap when you're talking about a mass noun.

HESTER: The cap analogy fails b/c the role is not quantifiable. If I restrict the role from first striking, you have CP competition on first striking alone.

GONZO: But a T argument against your failure to restrict THE role.

MANCUSO: As the proponent of missions, I'd like to say that this is the exact problem w/ role. It would sabotage this topic in my opinion if you just have role in there, b/c you can't restrict a singular role by getting rid of first strike. Deterrence would still be the overriding role. If the solution is make roles plural, then it means missions! That's what I've been saying all along. If this topic gets changed so that it only says role, it will become all about the size portion. No one will ever win they're T under role. The virtue of the compromise of including all three was that it was a compromise and didn't require this re-litigation. This boogeyman of the Minsk/Smolensk whatever is completely made up. No one has come up w/ a single card for that. I feel strongly that missions or roles plural needs to be in there, but if you think roles solves the problem you have with missions, you're wrong.

I hope we have time for making this a solely unilateral topic.

[afternoon meeting opens w/ topic #1]

STABLES: I think the limiting function is against things that are small relative to the squo, even if substantially hasn't had the clearest meaning.

LOWRY: We talked about whether or not to include the Article VI phrasing in the topic. We said it was best not to; it seemed redundant from a literature standpoint. We didn't want to force the aff to defend the NPT, especially K affs that don't want to defend the system. We could have two wordings, one which includes Article VI and one which does not.

STABLES: I don't think there's a meaningful substantive difference between the two, in terms of what affs are allowed and what affs are not. I think it could be bad for the aff to have an explicit reference to the NPT, and it does nothing for the neg.

ARNETT: I mean you're not going to put it in your plan.

STAHL: I'm not sure anyone has presented a reason to specify.

LACY: Tell me if I'm wrong. You don't want the aff bound by the entire NPT. Is using Article VI wording worse?

STABLES: I think so, since it introduces "good faith" and other wording. There is a question as to whether the 13 steps are Article VI commitments or implementation measures.

GONZO: My concern is just that they could do Atoms For Peace or other parts of the NPT.

STAHL: Neg will win that T debate.

GALLOWAY: It's not nuclear weapons posture.

KUSWA: Could someone win that our commitments are vacuous now?

STABLES: We have discussed the Bush argument that we are not obligated, but the legal consensus seems to be that we are obligated.

KUSWA: So if Obama changed his mind and decided we did not have commitments, what do we have in the second semester?

GALLOWAY: Even if Obama totally loses his mind, the neg can win that we have actual legal commitments.

SMITH: You took the NPT out b/c you're afraid people will put it in their plan?

STABLES: We were afraid affs would get assailed for their connection to the NPT.

SMITH: Is there another reason?

STABLES: Yes, Article VI, 13 steps, are they synonymous, are they not?

SMITH: Are you saying that being vaguer by saying "disarm commitments" actually is broader for the aff b/c it allows stuff in the 13 steps which aren't in Article VI explicitly?

STABLES: I think it avoids the possibility of confusion.

SMITH: Does it make it broader?

STABLES: It avoids a terrible T debate in which someone presents Bush's argument that Article VI doesn't say how comply.

SMITH: I have no understanding of the relevance of evidence saying Article VI does not have a means of compliance. Of course it doesn't, but the topic provides one by changing nuclear posture.

STABLES: There's a peace of evidence from the Bush lawyers that the 13 steps don't represent the Article VI commitment.

SMITH: That makes no sense at all as an argument in a debate round. If I read evidence that Bush said the 13 steps don't fulfill our commitments, are you saying that would be neg evidence against an aff that did something in the 13 steps?

STABLES: Yes. That's a T argument that this omits.

SMITH: What evidence is there that there are obligations outside of Article VI?

STABLES: If the 13 steps are outside of Article VI...

SMITH: My concern is that there are other commitments.

STABLES: If we discovered new extant commitments, how does that affect the topic? Conceding one exists, it would have no impact, b/c they all have to go through the NPT.

SMITH: It's maybe broader. And Article VI explicitly allows for negotiation.

STABLES: I just think there's a risk that people will read this bad T violation against the 13 steps. Do you think there's a greater negotiating ability w/ Article VI?

SMITH: Yes.

HESTER: Don't you think the aff could say Article VI is a clear commitment and includes negotiation?

SMITH: Alright. That's a good point.

KEENAN: I don't know about "restrict the use."

STAHL: We need the word "its" in there.

FITZMIER: Can someone say the argument for "restrict and reduce" again?

MANCUSO: Some definitions of "reduce" say "not allow an increase"?

FITZMIER: What about just reduce?

MANCUSO: "Restrict" gives a binding legal sense to it. "Restrict" can be effectual. It's kinda a weak one-two punch that adds up.

KUSWA: That new version of plan #2 looks good.

STABLES: Any other questions about approach #3 other than the relevant cross-applications from other resolutions?

[no]

MANCUSO: Let's look at #4 next since they're very similar.

STAHL: Can we look to 1 and 2 first, since they lend elements to 3 and 4?

MANCUSO: My problems w/ 4 are conceptual, not wording, b/c it's not bigger or smaller. It's just different.

LACY: If it's supposed to be open-ended, they should be bigger?

STAHL: We're just not sure if that's good across the board.

MANCUSO: The only way it's smaller is Russia.

STAHL: I think 3 and 4 are so similar we may not need both on the ballot.

STABLES: What are the differences?

KUSWA: A much larger multilateral area, and we don't know all the treaties available.

BROSSMAN: What about swapping the Russia wordings?

ARNETT: If there is a difference, I'm not sure both Russia wordings can be good.

STAHL: I think the one in 3 allows affs to discuss cuts and more.

ARNETT: And I think that's necessary to get any aff to work.

STABLES: Could the aff claim additional negotiation issues under the phrasing in #4?

SMITH: It seems as if they could use them as bargaining chips, but maybe they couldn't be in this final agreement.

MANCUSO: Your version in #3 seems very broad.

STAHL: I'm ok w/ that since it must always include deep reductions.

STABLES: Plus, changing status quo means that deep cuts plus is good second semester material.

SMITH: There are sizable differences, stem, multilateral, FMCT.

STAHL: Can I hear an argument for a bunch of multilateral agreements we aren't even sure of?

STABLES: Is "extant" the limit?

SMITH: Yeah, it is a limit, isn't it?

STAHL: Yes, I'm just worried we haven't vetted the ground on both sides.

MANCUSO: On one hand, we don't know what the core neg ground is for some of these treaties. On the other hand, there are people who don't want the topic committee to sit here and predict every aff today.

SMITH: The agreements that exist on nuclear disarm have the core neg ground that the US needs to maintain a robust nuclear presence. There's a reason in the status quo we haven't done this stuff. The neg has so much ground. You could give the aff Utopia as their aff, and the neg would win 40% of their debates.

[Ross and Lacy argue for a while]

ATCHISON: Greta mentioned that Andrea cut some cards on other extant treaties.

REED: There's a space treaty and [another disarmament treaty, didn't get the name].

MANCUSO: The philosophical point of including a more open-ended list is that we don't have the answers to all these questions for us.

ATCHISON: I think that we can get rid of #4 b/c Gordon's is going to establish multilateral.

STAHL: There is considerable aff flexibility in #3, in every plank except CTBT.

ATCHISON: As JP was kinda saying, can someone shut down scientists or a train or whatever, b/c w/o them, the weapons are less ready?

STAHL: Maybe.

KUSWA: The word "arsenal" might help that. It's a little smaller than systems.

STAHL: If the goal of your aff is to make nuclear weapons not operationally ready, the neg will have ground, whether you do it by firing scientists or de-alerting.

MANCUSO: Unless there's a weird advantage ...

ATCHISON: Yeah, like a nuclear accidents ban-the-railroads aff.

LACY: ...going for "substantial."

MANCUSO: There's a chance that the word "operational" limits that. I have no idea what "operational" means. It's in there for something. I guess, I assume.

STABLES: All those in favor of using the last phrase "substantially reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons" as a replacement?

[it passes]

LACY: There are bullets instead of commas.

STAHL: We've used them before.

LACY: Do we want "include"?

["including" gets replaced by "at least"]

[the committee now realizes that plank 2 is bidirectional and adds a comma]

[Mancuso moves to add "reduce" to plank 2 to avoid plans that restrict use in hypothetical situations]

STAHL: So put in the phrase "decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems" from this U.N. document?

FITZMIER: Doesn't "systems" allow for subs and the like?

MANCUSO: This [document, I didn't catch what exactly] also uses the "rapid-launch" phrase.

BELLON: I think you're stuck in a bad position here, b/c there is literature saying we've never been on alert 4 times ever. The more you do "systems" the more you allow.

STAHL: The language they used at the NPT Review Conference was concretely reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. One way you de-alert them is to change the nuclear silos.

LACY: I don't think you necessarily need systems. You can't shoot the bomb until you open the hatch. The weapon is not ready until the hatch is open.

STAHL: I don't follow.

KUSWA: "Systems" is one of the largest. It's basically like "complex."

BROVERO: The DoD definition of "nuclear weapons system" is the weapon and facilities, personnel, transport, maintenance, [list goes on, I lost it, but you get the idea].

STABLES: Can they do it if they address just the weapons?

KUSWA: Yes, there are broad enough definitions.

LACY: Not all systems are weapons, but discussing the weapons involves the absolutely intrinsically related elements of the systems.

HESTER: If the whole point of this resolution is to be a smaller topic, why is changing how fast we fire them necessary? Why is de-alert such important ground?

STAHL: We want to access to good affs. De-alert is one of the stronger ones.

HESTER: Some would say that about CTBT. If the aff has the choice of number of weapons, declaratory policy, etc., what does de-alert bring to the table except avoidance of those other debates? What is so great about de-alert debates? And you can't find a phrase that limits it to what you want it to. Why is it necessary?

FITZMIER: It's not b/c it's a good aff; it's b/c it's a good debate, right?

HESTER: Is it?

STABLES: No one takes Blair seriously, which I think makes it a bad aff. It's not uncommon for opponents to avoid direct engagement w/ Blair, just ignoring his fundamental premise about alert status.

ARNETT: We have a lot to cover. Let's vote on de-alert in or out.

[5 committee members give de-alert a majority]

ARNETT: To deal w/ Greta's concern that "a no first use pledge" is universal, I have this card distinguishing between blanket and precise.

GRETA: My concern is that in the T debate, it'll be interpreted as universal and say limits.

ARNETT: They can maybe say "substantial" means that, but I don't think they can say NFU alone.

STABLES: "pledge" vs. "policy"? I'm doing a little on that

ARNETT: Also, does this allow conditional pledges?

[some people think it might]

MANCUSO: or you could say "ban on the first use of nuclear weapons"?

LACY: "a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons" might be less universal.

LACY, LEE, and OTHERS worry about the "ban" wording.

ARNETT: Before we move away from the "a no first use pledge" wording, let's have someone mount a case against the Iran and other affs.

SMITH: You all are relying on substantial to do some heavy lifting.

MANCUSO: What was wrong w/ the phrase “ban the first use of nuclear weapons”?

ATCHISON: The literature says “no first use.”

STAHL: It’s universal.

STABLES: Dave, I’m not opposed to your idea of “a no first use policy.”

ARNETT: It’s Ed’s, but I like it too.

LACY: “Pledge” makes it declaratory. “Policy” might be internal. I think.

SMITH: Yeah.

STABLES: Does "pledge" allow something less than the actual policy of the United States?

MANCUSO: Can I take a step back and say I prefer the wording Greta has in there this morning, even if it's broader? There would be viable T debates about broad and narrow meanings of the word "use." If the objection w/ it is that it basically imports the other topic, I think it might, but I also think that Greta's card, the 4 categories card, gives the neg a leg to stand on. I think we need to not try to word this NFU part right here right now. Someone needs to do an hour's work on this.

[straw poll of the committee on original wording or NFU wording]

GRETA: If people are so worried about "adopt" meaning a vote, we can may be change it.

MANCUSO: I'm with Greta. The literature is replete with "adopt" a NFU pledge.

STABLES: Tell Hardy the aff isn't locked into Congress. [Hey, Aaron! Hope you're doing well.]

Ok, de-alert.

SMITH: Are our weapons on high alert status now?

MANCUSO: There's literature in opposition to "rapid-launch."

STAHL: "Decrease the operational status of nuclear weapon systems" appears in a U.N. report on de-alert

STABLES: Does going to the narrower definition lend itself to the smaller de-alert affs? I want to make sure we do large decreases in operational status.

LACY: The broader you make this category, the more the aff has to do to be substantial.

SMITH: Greta, can you paste in that whole U.N. statement?

STAHL: Yes.

STABLES: "Operational status" seems to differentiate the core de-alerting affs from the others.

STABLES: So we need to tackle high alert status.

STAHL: I just looked over what Antonucci said. He thinks we should use the term of art "de-alert."

STABLES: Well, it's politicized. Blair says it means one thing, and others refuse to agree to that interpretation. We can return to that after a small break -- what else do we need to tackle in a few minutes off?

STAHL: Galloway seems worried about "adopt" and "implement" and "use."

STABLES: I'm not as familiar, I'll be honest. What risks does "use" open?

KUSWA: It's like the high school topic. "Use" could be a very broad category.

GALLOWAY: Looking at this definition of "declaratory policy," I am very worried about "adopt."

STAHL: I realize there is a definition of "adopt" as a vote. Words have many definitions. There is no context in declaratory policy for using "adopt" as Congress. "Adopt" is the word used in the literature.

GALLOWAY: I haven't seen any document to that effect.

MORRIS: A Google search demonstrates "adopt declaratory policy" is in very common use.

GALLOWAY: I don't know what the purpose of the new declaratory policy wording is.

STAHL: "Universal NFU" was not the wording yesterday, and it was not what the committee seemed to want.

STABLES: We can further resolve the issue of the agent to avoid the enact problem. What other kind of affirmatives are topical under a broad definition of "use"?

GALLOWAY: I think it risks writing in the entirety of my and Kevin's topic as a subset. I think "use" means "role and mission." Perhaps it is limited by "declaratory policy," but I still haven't been told what that phrase means.

ATCHISON: If "declaratory policy" controls what has to be reduced..

GALLOWAY: Does it?

MANCUSO: I 90% agree w/ Ryan. This would essentially allow public statements about the entirety of topic #2.

STAHL: I think the neg can win that "adopt" requires implementation.

LACY: Is "adopt a universal no first use pledge" an acceptable alternative?

GALLOWAY: Gordon and I opposed that b/c the neg will rip it apart w/ their CPs.

STABLES: I don't know anyone who likes the narrow version.

ARNETT: Do you want to change this wording?

GALLOWAY: A claim has been made multiple times that this topic is narrow.

LACY: How do we reduce it?

GALLOWAY: I'd need to do some work.

STAHL: Unlike the HS topic, the neg would win T debates b/c the aff can't say there are no affs under a limited interpretation.

STAHL: Are we going to take FMCT out?

STABLES: We need to be comfortable w/ every option on the ballot. Is this two versions, one w/o it? Or one version w/o it?

STAHL: Ryan seems to believe that if we leave it in, much more wording work is required.

MANCUSO: I think that "a fissile material cutoff treaty" would fix it. Some of our problems are of our own creation by being too specific. The aff would have to negotiate something that has been considered an FMCT. There may be some variations, which I don't know enough about. I think it is a term of art. You would agree, Ryan, with that phrasing?

GALLOWAY: Yes. One of the reasons I am more comfortable w/ that. I would be happy as the neg reading this card trying to define the FMCT process and say the aff doesn't do all these elements.

STABLES: With that adjustment...

KUSWA: Jarrod makes the good point it will still be a negative position.

STABLES: Are we now talking about two lists? Dave and Greta mentioned multiple lists.

ATCHISON: In order to answer that, can we have a 30 sec debate among people who have researched it as to what we gain by having this in the topic?

STABLES: The literature says it would be the one multilateral forum. It's been the hotbed of int'l movement towards the NPT Review. That working group has the most to do moving forward. This gets us into the non-weaponized components, which may be too broad.

ATCHISON: Sounds like one of the best topic-specific DAs... coming down the pipe.

MANCUSO: Obama is pursuing it. It sounds like the status quo.

LACY: The aff would have to substantially change Obama's position.

MANCUSO: If you haven't been reading the papers the last two or three days, you might not realize how strong Obama's stance is.

ATCHISON: It has a chance to solve the aff if it passes. That's a good DA.

BROSSMAN: THe US has been pursuing FMCT for 12 years, and China and Russia were holding it up.

ARNETT: It's clear that Obama is going to push it, but it's not at all clear the Congress is going to pass it. That would be a substantial change in our posture. There's a good chance it will be inherent.

DAVIS: I will say that it's at the core of the verifiability debate.

MANCUSO: My hesitation with two options is that if this is the only difference, it seems hardly substantial enough to put both on the ballot. Part of my interest there is reducing the confusion of what people understand as the differences.

BROSSMAN: It takes the topic in some very different ways. I think if you put them both on the ballot, it seems like a significant difference. Speaking as one, it would have an impact on how we voted.

STABLES: I think that's a meaningful choice.

MANCUSO: As the day goes on, we're going to have a lot of tough decisions, but we need to have a presumption against dividing topics or we'll end up w/ 10. Maybe this is one we should.

KUSWA: I'll say take it off. Can we vote on this?

[Removing FMCT from the list passes]

MANCUSO: The Russia part of your list is very broad, but that's ok.

STAHL: If they did a bunch of verification and stuff, the neg can CP that out. The aff has to include substantial cuts.

Shalmon did some research last night that raised significant problems for targeting. There's not a clear line on targeting, and it switches in crisis mode. And more importantly, we don't know what current US targeting is, b/c so much of it is classified. We don't know enough to debate it, and we don't want the aff to be secret. Targeting will be a part of use and cuts debates. You could always just do targeted cuts to the arsenal that caused that shift. No real way to control the directionality of the targeting part of the topic, and I think we'll get lots of the education anyway.

I'm sure people will disagree w/ that assessment, but I urge people to read Shalmon's cards.

STABLES: I think the public disclosure vs. covert policy issue is unavoidable in some way. And we did it on presidential powers. But, that being said, I don't disagree with your conclusion, that we don't have an effective wording to allow the targeting affs we want and not the ones we don't.

STAHL: I strongly feel that there should be at least one resolution that doesn't include targeting.

LACY: I worry there's no targeting wording that stops people from stopping hypotheticals like fighting the aliens in 2050. Why do we want to include it?

STABLES: Well, the Korea debate.

STAHL: I don't know how re-targeting reduces our reliance.

MANCUSO: Well it requires us to use conventional weapons against airports, etc. But declaratory policy links to all your concerns, b/c Kevin's 10 item list card includes things like declaring counter-force. I'm fine w/ taking the targeting wording out since I think they're all topical anyway under declaratory policy.

STAHL: I think that means we agree on the wording as it is now then.

MANCUSO: Fair enough.

GALLOWAY: How does the word "adopt" work here?

STAHL: "Adopt" is the term of art for that. The one problem with it is that I found one definition that it requires a vote, which I don't think contextualizes to nuclear policy.

GALLOWAY: I worry this is how we get into trouble, adding a lot of words at the end of the meeting. "Use" might easily mean "role," according to our paper.

ARNETT: What are all the new words?

GALLOWAY: use, adopt, implement, ending the production of fissile material -- I'm not even sure that's what the FMCT does from my research last night

STAHL: I looked it up. I didn't just make this up.

GALLOWAY: I respect all you've done. I want to have a list topic, but I've seen this happen.

STAHL: The "fissile material cutoff treaty" is not a term of art b/c one doesn't exist yet... "the FMCT" refers to something that doesn't exist, and "a FMCT" doesn't necessarily mean something precise. an FMCT could include lots of different things

BAUSCHARD: I wonder if anyone thinks this topic might be a little too big, and since there are some words we aren't sure of, would it hurt to take something out of there, especially something with wording problems? Like FMCT, you can always read the CP.

STAHL: I'd be fine w/ taking FMCT out.

BAUSCHARD: Yesterday, people talked about how that included nuclear energy and reactors.

KUSWA: FMCT might not even be consistent w/ the stem, b/c it might not be part of posture.

ATCHISON: Taking it out of the topic doesn't remove it from our discussions -- happening now, it's a DA, there ya go.

STAHL: Limited the treaties part of the list to CTBT. Other extant treaties like space and other disarm treaties and possibly other ones we haven’t found.

Replaced “in” with “of” thanks to Kelly Young’s suggestion that “in” suggests the size of the weapons.

Possibly could add “some or all” before nuclear weapons.

Antonucci asked if aff should be allowed to do unilateral or bilateral de-alert.

MANCUSO: Does “implement substantial reductions” allow the aff to take reductions we’ve already agreed to and put them into action?

BELLON: The stem requires a substantial change, which may limit out those affs.

ARNETT: And isn’t implementing those a big deal?

MANCUSO: You could maybe speed up current reductions.

STAHL: Probably not substantial.

MANCUSO: Are we sure we’re on “high alert status now”?

LACY: Can you “remove them from high alert status” by putting them on higher alert?

SOMEONE: Or launching them off?

STAHL: I worry “good faith” has such a broad precise meaning that the aff would have to put it in their plan or face topicality concerns. So I tried out the current wording to require the aff to implement the result of negotiations if it is what they are trying to achieve.

MANCUSO: I also fear “good faith” and worry about competition for “excellent faith” counterplans and the like.

Here’s my alternative: on the treaties topic, the wording was just “ratify and implement,” so we could say “negotiate and implement.”

STAHL: We seemed to determine that required them to implement even if negotiations fail.

If we proposed disarm, and Russia said no, we’d be screwed.

ATCHISON: That may not be the case if it’s “negotiate X and implement the treaty.”

MANCUSO: That’s not forcing them to implement their goal. We want to force the aff to implement the result of the negotiations.

BELLON: I think that putting “agreement” or “treaty” in there makes it a lot easier.

STAHL: I changed the wording on the google document to reflect the conversation we just had. So if everyone could take a look at that...

Hello all,

Thanks for the hard work to this point!

I would be remiss if I didnt bring up some real concerns many of us have with "negative" ground. I know that at least a few of us, chatting on and off with them all day, were pretty happy with Aff ground being all the established great literature on jumpstrating multilateral action through UNILATERAL action and the negative getting the Deterrence DA + multilateral action (was even noted in the topic paper that neg should get multilateral).

The only argument I have seen for Aff getting "multilateral" ground is that the unilateral affs are bad. However, the multilateral aff really does damage to the good deterrence links (which presume that unilateral action would be perceived as an attempt to back away from committments/extended deterrence). I also saw a TON of aff cards for the US unilaterally jumpstarting things like START, Fissile Cut Off, and Tacticals. This seems a big problem for the following reasons:

1) Usually the topic forces the affirmative to do the opposite of the current administration/something controversial. This topic gives the aff the same end as will likely be passed during the current administration and probably this year.

2) The literature on De-alerting, CTBT, START, NMD, changing targeting, literature check aff...some of them FAR aff.

Obviously the mood in the larger room was for more affirmative flexibility, but my fear is that this slate errs way way on the other side.

I am sure I am missing the discussion of the negative as opposed to good/bad aff ground...but is there really no concern that we are making coin flips pretty significant here?

In fairness, I have only spent a bit of time pouring through the blog...so I apologize if I am not getting the args for the neg. Or at least why giving the aff the timing of implementation, the same direction as the sq, the lit bonus, and unilateral and multilateral makes sense.

Josh

Joshua B. Hoe
Director of Debate
The University of Michigan

Stables: I'd encourage folks to help. We’ve done a great job of looking at other people’s work, small help is really important. Given that we don’t reconvene until tomorrow, I’d ask that after dinner folks decide and try to get works in by 8:30 so everyone has time to look over it.

Greta: Can you resolve the question of whether we only want one list to start out with? Can my group produce more than one list?

Galloway: I’m nervous, worried the clock is ticking.

Greta: Agreed, but there will be substantial overlap.

Mancuso: Do you sense that there are a lot of people that want list topics?

Greta: yes. If they don’t want list topics they won’t win.

Mancuso: You can flood the ballot. The more you put on the ballot, the more it provides confusion.

Greta: the point is to provide meaningful differences, there are meaningful differences in what they would allow. The other question I wanted to pose. If there are certain things the committee wants or does not want to appear on the ballot, for example, any multilateral agreement or limit that to CTBT, I was hoping to get a sense from people of what they want to be on the list.

Galloway: This would mean nuclear weapons free zones?

Greta: Yes

Stables: I would dissuade people from making declaratory policy specific.

Greta: I’m not sure “declaratory policy” is the right phrase. You want us to include changes in posture, somewhat broad?

Stables: I think that would allow more good affirmatives.

Mancuso: I think targeting affirmatives have to be represented. Banning counterforce is totally fundamental. I want to reaffirm Gordon’s statement about making this open-ended.

Atchison: we haven’t had much discussion on NWFZ.

Greta: I don’t think there’s been much research on it.

Antonucci: There are 4 extant ones we haven’t signed up to, it would be technically topical.

Kuswa: If there wasn’t a list, you could increase conventional and so on. Are we still wanting different stems between 3.1, 3.2, 3.3?

Greta: The planks in the threes are very specific in directionality. Substantial reductions would be very hard to cut back in the other direction.

Galloway: China?

Greta: There wasn’t an aff that would do substantial reductions in weapons with China, so it would have to be something else.

Galloway: We have to serious that this topic is going to go through some status quo revisions. I think excluding the possibility of China is problematic.

Greta: the types of affs you would read with China do not fit well with the ground or categories we’ve discovered.

Stables: Shifting gears to approach to mission size roles.

Mancuso: 2.2 can be deleted, 2.4 should supercede 2.2, and 2.3 should be changed to reflect reduce and restrict. Make every option reduce and restrict. The only difference between 2.2 and 2.3 is to tack on, at the end, unilateral.

Greta: does multilateral include bilateral?

Atchison: Does 2.2 appear more satisfactory under any circumstance than 2.3? Isn’t 2.2 the greatest risk of unilateral, which we decided we didn’t want?

Galloway: The question is of policies/initiatives, reduce/restrict, what’s the best way to make sure we’re including unilateral, multilateral, or bilateral. Does anyone else have additional things?

Mancuso: I think 2.1 is a non-starter, we should narrow it to 2.3

2.1 is voted out.

Stables: Material is updated on google docs. One thing I want to highlight: Seth sent out material for “in good faith.” Folks should look at and identify with it because it will help as we move along.

Stables: We have 5 baseline topics. What other criterion should be used?

Mancuso: fidelity to the topic papers.

Stables: and what should be the major affirmatives, multilateralism, fidelity to the topic papers...

Ross: people repeatedly said, room for a giant critical disarm aff

Mancuso: I agree, that’s fair. I think, and I’m basing this on feedback, there has to be some small element of openness to the resolution. I get a lot of feedback from people saying I want to write a different aff than what ya’ll thought of at the meeting.

Brent: it seems like as long as there are options on the ballot that provides that option.

Mancuso: I’m interested in protecting minority rights here.

Kuswa: to clarify, 7 says restrict role or size. We’re OK with the idea the aff could just restrict the size?

Many: yes

Stables: Alright, so then, from a productivity standpoint, we need to assess what these wordings mean.

Atchison: Could we have a discussion between 8 and 7?

Mancuso: My proposal about limiting it down to those, was it passed?

Stables: It got some friendly tinkering. We think we agree with the fundamental four, but now: 3 (in some incarnation) 7 or 8, and 9, 10, 11 in one form, and 12.

Mancuso: have we gotten to where 1, 3, 5, and 6 are not?

Stables: we still need to assess which one of these uncertain clusters is going to be the representative, I don’t hear arguments for the others.

Galloway: I move for Steve’s proposal, with 9 being a list of 9, 10, and 11.

Stables: So 1, 2, 5, 6 are gone?

Several: 4?

Kuswa: 4 is reduce number and missions, the reason I’d like to keep that in some form is how we refer to number 7.

Mancuso: all that means is we would change 7 or 8 to “and” or “or.”

Kuswa: reduce or restrict on all, I think that’s meaningful. I don’t think we can say that restrict is the best verb for all of those.

Stables: So deleting from functional consideration 1, 2, 5, 6. Let’s leave them on there because numbers are based on the other numbers.

Mancuso: did we talk about restricting numbers?

Kuswa: Let’s play with that a bit more.

Stables: Is there any dispute to that as a foundation? We have 4 resolutions that have no bearing on the remaining four groups. We need, then, to break into working groups.

Galloway: I agree with that proposal.

Stables: Then, the goal would be to come in with the AM with 4 resolutions that have been justified on the basis of this criteria, and if that works it’s a slate, and if it fails we can revisit.

Mancuso: may I offer a tweaked version of that proposal. Set up the groups, break, then come back and talk about the groups. I don’t want the people working on 12 to turn it into a better topic.

Could there be a discussion about what kind of ground the negative is afforded under some of these resolutions?

The Economist posted the following about three hours ago:

http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1...

I think it is worth reading/discussing if negotiating an FMCT will be an explicit part of any resolution - it appears as if that will be part of the status quo.

Stables: Let’s ask Ross explicitly. Unilateral or multilateral?

Ross: there hasn’t been an argument made against the argument that unilateral is a disaster.

Kuswa: It’s not, some of the critical ground doesn’t depend on implementation, verification.

Ross: does every aff have to take that stance? If you think that the aff should be required to cut, then fine, but do it knowingly. So is your argument that that’s a better topic?

Kuswa: we could include both on the slate.

Ross: No, no, no. The argument in the paper that needs to be addressed is that it could be a bad debate topic.

Kuswa: I didn’t take that to mean that topic would be bad, but that those affirmatives would be bad. I’m a little more optimistic with what the debate community could do with a requirement that the affirmative only take unilateral action. Is that a better topic? I don’t know.

Stables : I was trying to survey the committee on this. If we diagnose any of these as unilateral only, that that is not a good option to appear on the ballot?

Ross: do you agree with your paper Arnett?

Atchison: should the aff have the option to negotiate?

Stables: the general direction is that if the aff can’t negotiate at all then it’s not a good aff.

Greta: Can we pose it as a simple question. If 7 is unilateral only, should we keep it off the ballot?

Mancuso: unilateral only should be disqualified, that’s my vote.

Stables: This may be a good transition point to other agenda items. We have a number of lists. Are there words or phrases we didn’t get an answer to or anything else we need more thought and discussion of?

Mancuso: I want to address a compromise between missions/role, now 7.

Atchison: Is there any role for negotiation in 7?

Mancuso: I think that’s debatable. You could borrow the end of 8.

Paul: It seems like that goes back to what Greta was saying, restrict requires unconditional.

Greta: I think the neg will win that restrict is a non-conditional verb, and that negotiations would make the restrictions conditional.

Mancuso: There will be a T debate. Some affs will try negotiations, and there will be a T debate that both sides will win

Brent: There is at least some contextual evidence that “arms control” is diametrically opposed to other things.

Stables: Was there a reason for “arms control?”

Mancuso: To open the possibility of multilateral negotiations. I’d be fine with multilateral in place of arms control.

Stables: It seems like the most crisp thing to do is get exactly what we’re trying to say.

Greta: It seems like we should assess wordings we have now, and which we want to go forward with, and make lists of affs that might be topical.

Ross: I think she’s totally right. A clear dividing line that should be discussed first would be whether or not the committee desires any of the topics to be on the ballot that would require the aff to undertake unilateral action. Dave’s paper spoke to the idea that that would be bad.

Arnett: Shakes his head

Ross: You didn’t endorse what other people wrote in the paper that had your name on it? It said “hey, that’s just bad ground.” And doing it through negotiation has more literature on its side. A good narrowing process would be to ask: is it true that all the topics, no matter how they’re worded, should allow a plan that might be negotiation.

Arnett: We’re going to disagree about what these topics allow.

Ross: You might have a disagreement over whether there would be wiggle room, but we’d know that if it doesn’t that you’d reject it. What are the criterion that you want to use to narrow these things, or do you want to just go through all 12 and ad hoc them?

Arnett: I think there should be that option.

Ross: Is there a consensus or not that the affirmative should have the negotiation? The next step is, if yes, that we should disallow topics that don’t allow that.

Mancuso: I want to make a proposal. I propose that we start working on a slate that includes resolution #3, with the wording change of “compliance” instead of “consistence,” and then either 7 or 8 where that’s a compromise on missions, role, and size.

Greta: you could keep 7 and 8 because 8 allows multilateral negotiations.

Mancuso: I think 8 might be better. Then, a list topic, so Greta can design a list topic, and then 12. Let’s do our winnowing, it’s a modified winnowing. It’s open-ended, it gives us Gordon’s, which is the biggest. At this point, everybody, we’re close, and we’re running out of time. I don’t like list topics, but I’m prepared to vote for one. I’m kicking the ball off, throwing out the first pitch.

Stables: these are two approaches.

Mancuso: when we get to our 4 we should immediately switch to Ross’s process.

Stables: Does anyone have a different list?

Galloway: I agree with Steve’s proposal, let’s look at it for 5 minutes to see if the numbers are right.

Stables: the thing we’re talking about is multilateralism, how much does it allow in?

Kuswa: 7 and 8, they’re getting cleaner, but an “and” for size and missions and role.

Stables: let’s start with criteria

Kuswa: Right, substitute the last part of 4. Something like that might be better to keep in the conversation.

Stables: Are there other major criteria people want to think about?

Greta: I think potentially if you want unilateral policy you should keep both 7 and 8.

Stables: Mancuso has added number 12, up on google documents.

Greta: I’m not opposed to putting 12 on the ballot, but it adds everything plus arms control, and is the second biggest next to Gordon’s topic. I want to keep at least one or two of the other lists on the topic.

Stables: We need to do work on declaratory policy

Greta: agreed, and see if it encompasses those things, and things like de-alert, which is an aff everyone wants in.

Paul: Mancuso, is yours just Gordon’s without multilateral negotiations?

Mancuso: Yeah, it’s Gordon’s stem. The first bullet is a lift from Dave’s paper, the second is a compromise on fissile. Like I said, I don’t feel strongly about China which is why it’s bracketed.

Atchison: Could I go back to Jon Paul’s question? Functionally, might this be smaller?

Paul: Article 6 has diminished the role of nuclear weapons, and I think it makes sense to view Gordon’s as the biggest and most simple.

Stables: The other item we need to pursue is the China question. Does it seem relevant?

Paul: Shalmon’s thing on China was just not a case people might run.

Arnett: Hotlines, transparency.

Stables: The current phrase its attached to is bilateral arms control.

Arnett: Under these there are some sweet China affs.

Mancuso: I wish that under our desire for a smaller topic we didn’t have to resort to a fixed ended list.

Antonucci: the affs we want to include are disparate, so the topic either has to be very large, or a list, because there’s not conceptual unity.

Arnett: Or maybe we think Gordon’s allows for all of them.

Antonucci: I have two knits to pick. Consistent verb tenses, and I don’t think you should use “warheads.”

Greta: I put weapons in for now.

Kuswa: Those knits have been picked.

Arnett: Well, the question is, do we need to do more work to figure out the T question, or are we under the assumption we’ll replace that with role, mission, posture…?

Stables: Whoever is working on that should make clear that is the goal.

Paul: One thing about good faith in negotiations. Steve, when you were talking about modified list one, and counter force targeting. To create more meaningful choices the list should go down to modified list 4. I’m with Greta, I think these things are huge…CTBT, NFU.

Mancuso: If you have a resolution that is treaty, treaty, treaty, not de-alert, not targeting, you are standing the topic on its head.

Paul: I think we can do de-alert, I’m just saying to create choice. To make it less like Gordon’s, which seems very large and inclusive of all this multilateral stuff. We can include de-alerting in modified list 3, but we can include something to say every restriction on use is not topical.

Stables: I would encourage a little more depth on some of these. The Senate may have 60 votes for a test ban treaty today. 2 of 5 of these are on the administration’s agenda.

Paul: I don’t think every ballot option should be decrease nuclear weapons use.

Lee: Let’s identify affs we want to debate. It seems like de-alert, counterforce would be superior to fissile material.

Stables: in the area that specifically identifies bilateral negotiations, it seems like Russia is the only one, and no one’s willing to make the fight for others.

Mancuso: I am. A topic that included strategic arms control with China and/or North Korea is A) interesting and B) consistent with our NPT commitments. The use of the 10 ways to reduce our role talked about bilateral agreements with more than Russia. I don’t feel super-strong about it, but I think there’s something there. It depends on how big the rest is conceptually in my mind.

Arnett: You have to get rid of the trick on Russia because a deep cut might not make sense with China. Hotlines, and whatnot.

Mancuso: It depends on how much the topic is going to write the plan. We could just say “arms control negotiations with Russia, China, and North Korea.” That’s a different philosophy about it. But I agree that you need a 15-20 word list if you want to include China under that philosophy.

Arnett: I think if we wanted to do something like that, we would want to offer something more narrow.

Mancuso: I get the sense that this topic approach is becoming one of those 600 word topics with long plans that we want to debate. I don’t think this is a case of short resolutions not working well. We’ve got a lot of words already tied up, and we’re going to spend more than half our time on this approach. Conceptually maybe what we do instead is screw the “write the plan” approach to the list and go back to what was proposed yesterday, an open-ended list, where each bullet point wasn’t someone’s plan but instead described a category. “Bilateral” arms control agreements could only take place with certain countries, because only a few have nukes. Otherwise, we have to write a 20 word plan for China and I don’t know if it’s worth the time.

Arnett: I can’t see…I think everything goes negotiation vs. no negotiation is not feasible. We should offer a middle ground.

Ross: You don’t think bilateral is too broad?

Arnett: I think bilateral is pretty big. I think the China example is a good one.

Ross: It wouldn’t be that big, has to be reductions.

Arnett: you have to screw China then.

Ross: That’s fine.

Arnett: But there are good transparency affs, that was Steve’s argument.

Ross: So there’s bilateral reduction, and that’s really limited.

Antonucci: It seems like there’s an instinct to be inclusive as possible. This topic, as currently constituted, is large, inherently. It incorporates the nuclear disarm issue. Incorporating all issues related to nuclear armament is going to be huge, almost unmanageably. One or two of these will be as large as Middle East.

Greta: one of these plans would be as large as treaties. CTBT alone was 1/3.

Bellon: While I agree with you overall, I think it is a size of impact issue and not size of aff plan area. I want to affirm what Dave said, I want a middle ground. I wonder whether there is a more delicate way to achieve that. I fully affirm those things not having a limit at all. I don’t know if this is a dead end or not, but it seems like good faith could have some potential as limits.

Greta: Modified list number 1 isn’t all that different from Arnett’s list yesterday. It limits bilateral negotiation to Russia. That’s the only difference, and it adds the FFCT. It still allows declaratory possibility, and any other agreement you can come up with that agrees now.

Bellon: so the minutia of wording only applies to one topic.

Mancuso: I like #1. I would split #5 in half. I would like to have somebody work on Russia or China tonight, whether there’s some interesting affs. I like modified list #1, and the role Gordon’s stem plays.

Stables: that should be the goal of meaningful attempts to differentiate.

Mancuso: Dave, in modified list number one, is de-alerting part of the second?

Arnett: My assumption was, yesterday, that we were going to replace the 2 and 3 with some of the other work that got done. There are good cards that tie eliminating to declaratory policy, and say we should change that to de-alerting. The original wording definitely allows bilateral de-alerting

Mancuso: I forgot we talked about that yesterday…you’ve got to have switch from counterforce as an affirmative.

Greta: including declaratory policy could include a new arms control treaty.

Galloway: “Good faith” may not be that bad a word. [card that it requires implementation of existing promises, as well as new ones].

Greta: So you could replace “implement” with “negotiate in good faith”

Galloway: 1, they have to say yes to implement, and 2 you can’t raise the bar so high they’ll say no.

Arnett: So you aren’t T if they say no?

Stables: under your current language, how is that not T?

Arnett: If they say yes, we’d implement.

Galloway: And if they say no, you can use Ed’s aff as an advantage. There are advantages to trying.

Seth: When you google it you get 20 legal dictionaries, which gives me some good faith

Stables: Article 6 uses that phrase

Mancuso: it would at least give the ground to say you weren’t serious so you weren’t T

Lacy: It says good faith in conjunction with other things.

Atchison: It seems like we’ll just have to deal with the reverse treaties aff.

Stables: what’s the process by which each of these topics makes negotiation legitimate and fair?

Arnett: I just think if you want to have negotiation in the topic, part of the debate about negotiation is that we have many results.

Stables: This is one part where Steve cautioned this morning. Debaters think proliferation is a series of legal treaties. I always thought that negotiations wasn’t scary because it was a more specific implementation of the more generic prolif affs.

Greta: You could split up the verbs: negotiate a bilateral agreement with Russia, including…and implement the outcome of these negotiations. If you want to allow negotiations, you have to do one of two things. You have to mandate they do it, even if they say no, or you have to deal with say no affs.

Galloway: What if Russia makes a demand that is unreasonable and unrelated to the negotiation?

Ross: Implement any agreement arising from said negotiations

Stables: I agree it’s one of those. We should feel comfortable with what should the aff commit to, regardless of the outcome.

Arnett: I thought you said your wording makes all the affs potentially negotiation.

Stables: I said I don’t think it provides ground to exclude them, but it makes them weaker.

Arnett: I thought you said words are policy.

Stables: It’s about changing our posture.

Arnett: but pronouncements are part of that.

Atchison: literally saying “we are willing to negotiate” – would that be a change in our nuclear posture?

Stables: People assume everything is Congress, a lot of this literature deals with executive.

Atchison: do you or do you not agree that is a change in our posture?

Stables: In some cases yes

Ross: Yes or no question

Stables: Yes

Ross: Can you give an example of when it’s not?

Stables: re-clarifying something Obama already says.

Atchison: Article 6 says “initiate a global disarm treaty.” Does that change posture?

Stables: I think there’s a reasonable argument for that

Greta: The “offer” and “implement” wording gets rid of some of these problems. So does “negotiate” and “implement.”

Stables: I think it was good to clarify that this was an area where the aff has a broad flexibility of mechanisms.

Arnett: That’s what I understood our mission to be.

Bellon: Do I hear Stables saying that we would have to implement something to change posture, and just offering negotiation is not sufficient?

Stables: In the same way with an aid topic, we would have to commit. The U.S. would have to commit to a policy statement saying they would do that.

Ed Lee: The aid topic, the check is already written. This topic, if they say no there’s no change in our policy.

Stables: I believe there is a politics link if the president announced disarmament.

Whitmore: Just putting it on the table.

Greta: I found a definition of declaratory policy that says “speeches” not just implementation.

Stables: This is not all codified in law because its executive action. Obama’s speeches, to some, constituted changes in policies of the United States.

Mancuso: We might want to put on the ballot a resolution like Gordon’s with a stem and a smaller list. If Gordon’s is an unrestrained adherence to NPT commitments, and Greta and Dave’s is a much smaller commitment, I don’t think that’s on face bad. That might be a meaningful choice for voters.

Lacy: I think the problem is people will read the short version as “anything but unilateral stuff” is extra topical.

Stables: None of what I’ve talked about is exclusive.

Seth: Sheer Nonsense

Greta: I didn’t get that

Seth: I don’t trust the inclement reductions T to check when there’s a sensible interpretation of implement “to provide means or expression for.” That meets article 6, its implementation, its negotiation.

Stables: Let’s backtrack to the desirability of different options. Without these list options you don’t think there’s an effective list of negotiations?

Greta: I think that’s the best way to get that outcome.

Stables: That’s tautological.

Arnett: Even if it’s weaker and not grounded in the literature, if there’s a negative interpretation that limits it out, T is a serious problem.

Stables: I think it’s tautological to presume that’s true in all cases. Do we think there’s any room for negotiation in terms of T?

Brent: Recent solvency evidence for NFU says you have to negotiate this with your allies. Some fundamental cases either can’t be done, or the solvency would be really difficult. NATO is one example.

Stables: I think that’s one aff that’s topical, severing commitment to NATO. There’s evidence for that.

Brent: Without telling them?

Stables: Yes. We have had other topics where we’ve enabled negotiation as a mechanism, ex: constructive engagement.

Brent: I agree action needs to be taken. I think the aff has to be able to discuss those actions as they take them. The negative can say Germany has the right to say no, the aff should have the right to say “we’re going to Germany, we’ll tell them, but we’re pulling the nukes out.”

Stables: The analogy is grand bargain with Iran. We’ve reached a point of comfort where you can negotiate and act. Now we’re talking about safeguarding the broader component.

Galloway: How well does offer work?

Greta: Like offer a QPQ?

Galloway: Offer to reduce reliance…

Greta: Offer does not inherently make that negotiation. You could offer a unilateral reduction in arms.

Stables: Is negotiation necessarily a QPQ?

Arnett: I think a negotiation, I’m going to go with its conditional.

Greta: If you offered the grand bargain, you can’t as aff defend less than the grand bargain. Negotiation could change in the process. Negotiation seems to be more of a process than an offer.

Stables: Even if we just keep your wording, what burden does the aff have under that statement to guarantee solvency. Russia might still say no. What grammatically in that sentence makes us not worried, we know the aff can’t be unreasonable because they have to do something.

Bellon: I’m worried implement requires completion.

Mancuso: Do you have a copy of the treaties topic?

Mancuso: if the resolution said “weapons” and the aff negotiated delivery systems, could the aff avoid deep cuts, through MIRVS?

Antonucci: Does the aff only negotiate over delivery systems?

Mancuso: I went over Kevin’s list of 10 things…it says we need to reduce warhead. Is reducing delivery vehicles reducing the weapon? We wouldn’t want to let them cut delivery vehicles to 1000, but keep all the warheads.

Antonucci: This may not account for MIRVS. If you take the delivery system off, it’s still a nuclear weapon. If you take the warhead off, it’s not a weapon anymore.

Mancuso: So if there are 1000 warheads, post plan there could not be more than 1000?

Antonucci: I don’t know if a MIRV is multiple weapons. This demands further research.

Arnett and Antonucci: Conclude somebody must be wrong, but unclear on who.

Arnett: Beyond that, there is the question of what else, if anything else, and how to approach that. The only way to limit it, if we want other countries, would require big reciprocal cuts. That means there’s not much else. I got the feeling people were happy with that and afraid of going the other way.

Brent: Do you envision that as a unilateral cut or do you negotiate

Greta: we need a unilateral option

Brent: I get that, but there’s a lot of literature that disarm’s unpopular absent negotiations with people. Does that option of a universal action preclude interpretations to engage in arms reductions through negotiations?

Greta: There’s not a single viable way to make that work.

Ross: That’s a topicality question, you could reduce or restrict or whatever through multilateral reductions.

Greta: I think if I was a policymaker talking about disarmament, that might be true. I think very few policy teams will run disarmament. I don’t know that limiting the aff to unilateral disarmament makes a difference for the teams that will run it.

Mancuso: Of the 10 things that could be topical, number 10 is to negotiate disarmament.

Brent: The requirement is to negotiate for disarmament in good faith. I don’t know how we can say affirmatives can’t abide by the NPT.

Greta: I’m just not sure how there’s any limiting scope at all on the affs if you put that kind of language in the resolution.

Lacy: Article 6 is we pledge to negotiate to eliminate nuclear weapons

Stables: Say we approach it from the other angle, we want to prevent affirmatives from negotiating, should our interpretations be adjusted to check that?

Arnett: I think all of them

Paul: On what term?

Arnett: Reduce, or change

Greta: I don’t think reduce is to negotiate something, you just reduce it.

Stables: What words are you using for that?

Greta: Reduce – I don’t think going to the U.N. and saying we want to negotiate is a reduction.

Paul: It does seem like it changes its posture, and its clearly more consistent.

Greta: It fits under Gordon’s topic but not others.

Paul: You have to take a stance, but you don’t have to reduce immediately

Stables: part of it is the literature based on what you can do and what you can do with other countries. A change in declaratory U.S. policy might reduce, I think most of these articles are written in the context of what Obama can do to change U.S. perception.

Ross: If you want to prohibit the aff from negotiating, you stick the word “unilateral” in. I don’t trust Arnett and Greta in June saying “this won’t be topical.”

Arnett: I just think if we want negotiation we better include it. Explicitly

Ross: I think it’s not explicit if you don’t put unilateral in it. I think negotiations are good, but if you don’t want them sticking in “unilateral” solves.

Lacy: If you do want it, how to you guarantee.

Ross: Be explicit: “implement through unilateral or…”

Antonucci: I had my dance and I’ll stick by it. I think “weapons” is better and bigger than warheads. All the weapons have warheads. I don’t know what aff we have with “weapons” that we don’t want that wouldn’t make it in under “warheads.” It seems like we run the risk of compromising solvency by saying “warheads” but there’s no disad to weapons.

Arnett: Not only would there by affs about delivery systems, there would be affs about NMD, everything that’s on the table.

Stables: This is the MIRV vs. delivery system debate. The history of the MIRV in US-Russia nuclear negotiations suggests there is a difference. What’s the justification for even engaging the idea that it’s the warhead as opposed to the warhead and the delivery system?

Arnett: There’s a discussion that if they [Russia] reduce warheads, they want concessions on delivery systems as well.

Stables: If you have a definition of warhead that includes delivery systems in the warhead…

Arnett: It doesn’t

Antonucci: Everything you say the solvency cards say is included under “weapons.” This may have a relevantly marginal impact on debates.

Arnett: We could add including.

Seth Gannon: Looks excited.

Mancuso: The literature may mention warheads, but does it fail to mention weapons?

Arnett: I don’t know. Certainly, it’s talking about weapons. I don’t think there’s a problem with weapons. I could do a little more work. It seems like there should be a card that says “aff plan and weapons” if we’re going to do that.

The discussion turns to Russia affs at our post-lunch session.

Greta: we thought Russia was the only country with potential for broad bilateral reductions.

Arnett: We started from the assumption that the goal was to keep START negotiations in, but not allow every aff on the topic to become “negotiate with Russia.” That took a little work, but we found a card for it.

Greta: We were worried about affs that just renegotiated regimes, and how negative ground would apply to that.

Ed: Is it a floor for what has to be negotiated or implemented?

Arnett: Implemented. You don’t have to do the cut up front.

Ed: What if they say no? Do you still have to make the cut?

Arnett: I don’t know. That’s a bad aff.

Ed: We just talk to them, that’s the only advantage to the aff. I think you’re right that’s a terrible aff.

Greta: I don’t know if there’s a way to check that. Deep unilateral reductions is not good aff ground, we wanted to find a way to negotiate with Russia to make that more manageable.

Ed: My way to deal would be to take it off the table immediately. Ratify and implement what was negotiated becomes topical. START at some point becomes topical.

Greta: You don’t think that would be worse for the neg? It seems like if we just negotiated one, there might be momentum.

Stables: I have a different perspective. It’s not like we’re not going to agree to something with Russia.

Arnett: I found a card that a new accord could be reached soon.

Stables: is the implementation of this topical like Ed’s aff? I only ask because I don’t think there’s ground to go below the floor. I’m worried about tiny mechanism aff, where the verification and implementation would be the core of the remaining Russia aff.

Greta: At the same time, I’m hesitant to cut Russia out.

Arnett: I think the new accord is not just an agreement on cuts

Stables: We’re still at 30 years on the NPT figuring out how to implement.

Greta: That’s an issue where the stem could be relevant. I don’t know if you could be a substantial change in nuclear posture by ironing out verification.

Arnett: I do think there is a scenario where the old START gets extended and this takes a while longer. The aff just may go away

Atchison: In that situation we still get the START DA. Negotiations happening now, aff comes in and jacks negotiating credibility.

Arnett: Shalmon did say this may be a reason to expand beyond Russia in the wording. If you still kept the floor there aren’t very many affs. There’s not a reciprocal cuts aff with China, for example, but maybe there’s a North Korea aff, about how deployments there. This could be an escape hatch if we want to err on the side of a little bigger.

Something else important: Dan [Shalmon] likes “weapons,” I like “warheads.” Substantially reducing “nuclear warheads” seems to accomplish a lot of neg ground issues.

Greta: I think we should stick to weapons in the general part of the topic.

Stables: I just pasted all of the wordings into google documents [you should be able to follow along there]

STABLES: Before we break for lunch, I think that when we go to the next working group, the two guiding principles laid out this morning are grammatical accuracy and what it allows and what it doesn't allow. If we answer those two questions, we'll have time to lay out the fundamental questions for tonight's work. I know we have MIke's verification thing...

DAVIS: That'll be quick.

STABLES: Anything else?

[Nothing else presents itself.]

STABLES: Lunch.

[drop curtain]

Welcome back to Topic Meeting 2009. It’s Seth, filling in for your regular host Will Sears, who has left the studio to get Fitzmier from the airport. Antonucci opens this scene, in a striking pink polo shirt. His character requires no props other than a Dell laptop, a styrofoam cup, and a small anonymous book.

ANTONUCCI: Does “nuclear weapons” include testing? According to definitions from nuclear weapon free zones, it means nuclear exploding device, and testing does go boom. Plus, the text of the CTBT uses the phrase “nuclear weapons.”

I think we might need an additional phrase to include CTBT under the Mancuso definition. “Nuclear missions” seems to include full weapons. If it ends up being excluded, it’s by “missions” not by “weapons” or “arsenal.”

If “nuclear weapons” accidentally limits out FMCT, is there an impact to that? Did people feel like they were voting for that?

STABLES: Chris Jones clarifies that FMCT was not in the paper. He said it’d be a good idea, but it’s not in the paper.

MANCUSO: The paper does not say FMCT, but every report it cites as essential background reading does.

ANTONUCCI: “Nuclear explosive devices” may allow more things in.

Should we say “nuclear forces”? No. One, “nuclear forces” can also refer to a principle in physics, like strong and weak nuclear forces--a two-dimensional subset of our four-dimensional space-time. Two, it includes not just the warheads but all associated forces, like the conventional and ABM forces we use to support them. Three, “nuclear forces” has no clear statutory basis. They seem to have abandoned defining it in favor of these other smaller terms. “Strategic forces” might be better defined.

I don’t think we should say “nuclear arsenal,” which has no clear definition. It’s more metaphor and less statutory interpretation. “Nuclear arsenal” seems to include depleted uranium, and “nuclear weapons” does not. And if “nuclear arsenal” is stable in the way we want, it would just mean “nuclear weapons” anyway, so why risk it?

We have some good definitions of “stockpile, also known as the nuclear arsenal.” We could say “nuclear weapons arsenal.” That might not add anything, but as long as “nuclear weapons” is there, it won’t be a disaster.

Should we say “nuclear stockpiles”? I’m not sure, but I think probably not. It most likely lets in materials, according to some definitions. We can discuss whether that’s good or bad. So it allows FMCT, but it lets in any case that gets rid of plutonium and other fissile material, like MOX, etc. It’s also not that clear. If we want material stockpiles included, we should just say that: “material stockpiles and...” That seems the best route for clarity, rather than risking letting in things we don’t want.

KUSWA: How do “nuclear weapons” and “stockpile” interact? [or something to this effect]

ANTONUCCI: “Nuclear weapons stockpile” is plenty clear. Saying “nuclear weapons stockpile and/or nuclear material stockpile” would probably work.

[Here comes a small discussion of how “nuclear weapons” might allow affs that deal with the Sun. Some hilarity ensues.]

ANTONUCCI: “Nuclear exploding devices” has a clear statutory definition. A risk though is that some “nuclear exploding devices” might not be intended as weapons. It might allow in FMCT and perhaps even nuclear disposal cases.

STAHL: Did you investigate “warheads” at all?

ANTONUCCI: It’s pretty clear, but it’s more limited. “Weapons” means warheads and the launching device, so long as the device is destroyed in the attack. I don’t have any huge problem with “warhead,” but I think “weapons” does what we want a little better.

WHITMORE: What about fission or fusion weapons?

ANTONUCCI: I think “nuclear weapons” allows all the variants of atom bombs, H-bomb, etc.

WHITMORE: I’m thinking about future weapons and the like.

ANTONUCCI: If it uses a chain reaction destructively, it’s in.

STABLES: I think that’s true of almost any term we could use.

ANTONUCCI: Yes.

BROSSMAN: Now, the thirteen steps are clearly in the topic paper, and two of them discuss fissile material.

ANTONUCCI: Yes, but I don't think that's a problem for the Stables int'l commitments topic, b/c that resolution does not refer to the devices themselves directly.

STABLES: If we want to capture the broad role of weapons and fissile material, what phrase?

ANTONUCCI: Make it explicit that you're including fissile material by saying "fissile material stockpile."

STABLES: And if you don't want it?

ANTONUCCI: "Nuclear weapons." "Exploding device" allows more, but maybe you want that.

KUSWA: It's not worth the risk it includes power plants.

ANTONUCCI: I don't think it does. It might include some weird stuff, but I don't think it includes power plants.

Whitmore: I’m looking at the Cirincione evidence on page six, and I’m wondering about the most limiting interpretation. This evidence draws distinctions that make this extremely limiting in terms of what an aff can do.

Greta: I strongly concur with that. This goes back to the FX T argument from yesterday. Particularly if we use “restrict” as oppose to “reduce” it would be very difficult to win that reducing the size of the arsenal would be topical.

Mancuso: the way it would work, a law would pass: “we are going to subtract 1000 missions from the 2000 we have by eliminating 1000 of the missiles.”

Greta: I don’t think anyone who writes an article that proposes cutting a 1000 weapons says that we should cut 1000 missions.

Mancuso: Let me g ive you an example. Damage limitation – if we have 1000 missiles we’ve restricted the mission.

Greta: That we’re worse at it doesn’t mean we’ve restricted the mission. I can’t see these T debates playing out in any way that are beneficial to the aff.

Mancuso: To do otherwise would fly in the face of the topic paper authors, the committee. To say De-alert isn’t topical doesn’t sound compelling, you have to trust the aff to win a T debate.

Atchison: couldn’t we say mission and size to guarantee that?

Kuswa: Yeah, if you say “and”…

Atchison: I’m with Greta in terms of debate execution – that could be scary to be aff.

Mancuso: There are issues like de-alert that size doesn’t address.

Mancuso: to go back to missions vs. role there are 2 points I want to make. Role means either a general purpose, or a specific task. You have to ask: “do you want the affirmative to defend the world where they have to restrict a general goal, or whether they have to restrict specific tasks.” I think specific tasks are better. One: when you debate general goals, the aff is going to get backwashed –we can’t read deterrence turns, because it conflicts with general goal of reducing deterrence. With specific missions you can still have positive effects on general role. Two: its easier to verify whether the aff has changed a specific task. It’s easier for the aff to prove they reduce reliance.

--

Mancuso: If you’re going to let the aff stand up and say that we’re topical because we’re on this list, you are authorizing FX topicality. It’s either “the neg can’t win T” or the “neg can’t lose T.” Either way, they could say the topic committee authorized FX because of this. This is the door you open when you say “here are these 10 affirmatives, they’re ok, anything beyond is dangerous.”

Kuswa: You would have to prove that the effect of the missions anyway.

Stables: The question is subcategories. What warrant justifies why either interpretation does not allow microcategories to emerge.

Antonucci: Like a mission that is one component of the silo. Reading through the original document of the FAS its referring to missions in a cold war context. This is at least an extant possibility.

Kuswa: It says we need to strip our missions. That says that the idea behind restricting missions is to find the core role of nuclear weapons.

Stables: My aff is about counter-force targeting in North Korea. Why isn’t that topical? What’s different about it?

Kuswa: there was a fatal flaw with “role” that led us to add “size,” so arguably that affirmative example wouldn’t do the second half.

Stables: OK. I think part of the problem is that these aren’t that inconsistent. Unilateral cuts, topical or not?

Kuswa: You could probably find evidence. That gets to Greta and Dave. Are those good affs? Why are we working so hard to preserve them?

Stables: Anything else we missed on missions Steve?

Mancuso: Even within one of the 15 missions, stopping the bombing of one in one country when we continue to bomb and target that country. The MIRVS for Moscow, for example. I think that you have to win that that’s not substantial. But Kevin, you’re missing the point that you can do that under role. The only way to beat that aff under role is T substantial.

Stables: And that’s OK, that’s good. We had a CBM where we basically agreed. There’s no reason role or mission necessarily reduces the smaller affs.

Mancuso: I agree with you, that the strike North Korea aff is something we should be talking about. Perhaps all the attacks on one country would be substantial, but getting rid of one in Russia wouldn’t.

Whitmore: I still have a concern. It seems like this list of 15 is all about use, for the most part, and that Cirincione article makes a distinction between use and things like alert status.

Mancuso: He says that things like alert fall under that. He says survivability, like LOW/LOI…

Whitmore: And targeting?

Mancuso: Yeah. You can read it in that article, or the paper called “Missions: Topic Wordings.” Straight out of that he talks about all of those things in there. I think “missions” isn’t all about launching back, it’s about the ability to launch back, and a lot of those doctrinal changes would restrict that ability. If we had to wait until Russian missiles hit, that would be a restriction on one of our missions. I think adding size eliminates a lot of doubt about that.

Stables: Let’s talk roles and missions.

Antonucci: I’m worried about fringe affs that don’t allow us to strike X smelting plant. Where’s the difference defined.

Mancuso: 2005 document. Substantial checks your fringe affs.

Antonucci: Fair enough. What degree were you thinking?

Stables: Is this overwhelming, are there too many subcomponents?

Atchison: if there are overlapping problems that may be a reason to use both.

Hester: Do we want to change specific tactics for a single bombing Zimbabwe, or something more general?

Mancuso: That would not be substantial.

Antonucci: Fair. What were thinking in terms of degrees of specificity?

Mancuso: Middle

Hester: It’s a question of whether you respond to “attacks on the homeland” generally, or a specific attack on the homeland.

Kuswa: At some point you have to accept Antonucci’s worry.

Bellon: I think there are competing concerns, because there are casual uses of mission that talk about the smelting plant. And there are reasons the aff could win the T debate, because there are restrictive definitions of T.

Stables: There are contingency plans against non-nuclear states, perhaps we should be debating about these.

Kuswa: That’s away from the topic paper.

Hester: non-proliferation is about the way we use our nuclear weapons..

Stables: We get stuck using non-proliferation and disarmament, because attacking Pyonyang facilities is not technically non-proliferation but nonetheless important

Bellon: and/or makes for a huge topic. There’s concerns that both “role” and “mission” are too big and small-

Mancuso: It’s not too big or too small. We have arguments that role is too abstract and mission more specific.

Bellon: it just seems like we were having concerns on both of these issues, that the amorphousness has a lot of potential outcomes. Either too many affs are topical or not enough are functional. Grouping them together magnifies the extremes

Atchison: And/or provides disarm and deep cuts on the aff.

Bellon: We’ve gotten away from size. If its missions and size, or missions and/or size, you get disarm.

Mancuso: I don’t think “roles” is worth it then. Mission is all about disarmament. The only way we’re going to get disarmament is to get rid of our missions for nuclear weapons. These guys are all about disarmament and getting there. Other people, like the DOD, use “missions” in a cold-war way. But the people writing the joint report, the FAS, etc, they think about it differently.

Atchison: So there is no unique advantage to including “role” with mission. If we want disarm, we should just say “size.”

Mancuso: the benefit is if you want the aff to talk about specific tasks. Role and mission authorizes a lot more aff ground in total, which could be good.

Kuswa: Even though I like the FAS concreteness, I find the missions overlapping and somewhat contradictory. And then the question of whether you have to restrict the entirety of missions. We would be fine with missions, why add role? It brings in more of the underlying debate, as opposed to a mission being one micro-mechanism. It comes back to Steve’s point: if “substantially” checks all these small affs, we should use role to make sure that restricting a few missions changes the entire role. I don’t think substantial will do it with just missions. There will be a ton of tiny, potentially future missions that the plan restricts, they’re somehow related to one of these 13 points.

Lacy: Mumbles something.

Lacy: It seems like there’s a better way to solve the advantages than restricting. There’s a net benefit to the CP to reduce but not restrict.

Stables: Other questions?

Kuswa: We could talk some more about role and mission. A couple things. I think we’d be in good shape for either. There are lots of citations that use them together. Some use “role” or “roles” some use “mission” or “missions.” One small point – the need to put “weapons” in nuclear posture. People are using the phrase “nuclear weapons posture” – the review itself doesn’t always have it in there, but I think it limits it on the chance there are components other than nuclear weapons.

Stables: The countervailing wording becomes the argument…

Kuswa: is changing the wording changing the posture?

Stables: I agree with the limits argument. What authority does nuclear weapons review have that nuclear review doesn’t?

Kuswa: that’s just a question of whether we want to limit it further or not. Keep in mind that “nuclear weapons posture” or “nuclear posture” will be defined broadly in terms of role, mission, and size. That distinguishes between role and mission. There are good cards already in the initial use document, and I still think that that ev about the “10 ways the role can be reduced” is a really solid interpretation in one card. Something that comes up is this problem with role, the bidirectionality question. If the role is deterrence, can you reduce the role by decreasing deterrent value, for example by building conventional forces. I think the neg can win “reducing the role” means “decrease importance of” but we could use both to make them decrease the size and the role. You reduce the size, and restrict the role, or reduce the size and restrict the missions.

I don’t think mission is as-immune from bidirectionality question. There are cases where one mission contradicts another mission. There are ways to eliminate a few missions to strengthen others.

We could use both “mission” and “role” – they appear side by side in a lot of places. I still think it’s better to pick one.

Then, secondly, if we stay with mission as plural it might be more than the 12 or 13 that were listed that could be a good limiting document. Are all of these missions just different parts of deterrence? If so, and we break them up, then any foreign policy objective that can be enforced with the threat of use of nuclear weapons becomes topical. There is some interesting ev on this.

There are arguments that role and mission are the same, and don’t matter much. They might be somewhat interchangeable, especially if role refers to some larger system of deterrence. Bailey card: “deterrence by threatening…retaliation…the first mission has been updated.”

There are other problems with “role” we might not have looked at as carefully. On the one hand, it might just mean “broadly deter” which wouldn’t be limiting. There’s also the problem that we don’t define the role now. References Terpen card. He goes on to say the US has not achieved consensus on the role of nukes. This leads to good T debates, but it might be hard to predict. There are amorphous definitions of the status quo not providing a role or clear missions.

There is a distinction between role and other types of implementation. This is an interesting moment, where the role got smaller, but other changes were made. Reads cards that speaks to the extent that we can make the role smaller, but that may not matter if other actions are taken.

Greta: We don’t want to exclude literature about what it means to be compliant. I think that if the aff was off the wall I think the neg could win the T debate that disarm is defined by the 13 steps.

Atchison: Do you think you could be “more consistent” on transparency even if we’re transparent now?

Stables: That’s why I like “compliance.” Consistency is the one where we’re looking for countries to move in one direction, its more political.

At the end of my doc there’s a page of all the different permutations, did anyone have any questions?

I think most of the definitions exclude increasing conventional forces.

Atchison: Do you see these as different ballot options, or working towards one?

Stables: I don’t know if one of these people strikes people as more self-evident or useful, that’s a good point of clarification given that we use the voting system. We don’t need to say “if you dislike this you dislike all.”

Atchison: Could we offer permutations with defenses of inherent differences?

Stables: Substantively, I don’t think any of these wordings are that distinct. My thought would be for folks to look at these and see which strikes us as more meaningful or significant.

Galloway: how many choices do we have to provide?

Mancuso: 3.

Stables: There’s no maximum. Any other questions? Commitments singular or plural?

Greta: Plural, or you could just do disarmament.

Stables: I agree.

Mancuso: I’ll summarize Heidt’s findings. One concern was that “restrict” implied an agent of action, and honestly I don’t even see a hint that that could be the case. Heidt found plenty of examples of executive actions called “restrictions,” and we have the other definition that it’s a law, regulation, or contract. I don’t think that word boxes the affirmative into a specific agency. We’ve spent a couple hours at least on restrict, and we definitely have the ev from Heidt, so we don’t need to be concerned. Is “restrict” meaningfully different from “reduce”? I did lexis searches that differentiated them, and couldn’t find anything like that. They’re used in contract law, but I never found anything that compared the two approaches. Dictionary definition of restrict implies a legal curtailment might be one way to think about it. “Restriction” gives us a step towards beating back the effects T aspect of the topic. I think restrict is a stronger word. We could even use “circumscribe” as a replacement word, where the aff has to circumscribe the object and not reduce.

Greta: What about concern that restrict is to prevent from growing in the future and reduce is more baseline?

Galloway: Restrict by reducing. Some people say restrict an increase. I’m agreeing, but saying this isn’t a huge problem.

Bellon: What’s the difference between that and reducing?

Galloway: because reduce doesn’t get you to what Steve is talking about. You can’t use those things. I had the same concern Greta had – you could cap nukes, for example.

Sherry: Why is that better than what Ross said, restrict and reduce?

Kuswa: We can’t fully determine it without figuring out what the noun is.

Hester: Restrict alliance doesn’t make any sense.

Kuswa: That noun would make a difference.

Stables: ..the problem is that 8 years of the Bush administration arguing that Article 6 is Article 6. Ross was clear on this yesterday. I really struggled to locate where the US possesses nuclear disarmament commitments that are separate from this. This fear of the great unknown…it would be already have to change posture and be consistent with the NPT. The reference to article 6 itself resolves the fear of ambiguity. The commitment is to making progress on disarmament (Atchison card on p. 4)…this language is consistent with saying that this is an independent use…that possession of nuclear weapons ultimately is the article 6 commitment that we’re talking about.

Another significant thing: The status of the Obama administration is to recognize that Article 6 is legally binding on the US. While we have interesting legal interps from the prior administration, it’s not actually that complicated.

Also, there is something to be said for consistency vs. compliance. The phrase “consistent” is used more than “consistency.” Compliance is an option. Compliance does work well for broadening mechanisms to implement.

Atchison: So this would have to change force posture?

Stables: At the end of the day, yeah.

Greta: One goal was to make this not a prolif topic about North Korea, Iran, etc. The other thing was not to make it about the NPT. I don’t think that phraseology eliminates those objections.

Stables: It provides a topical check.

Bellon: After thinking about it, my concern with “disarm commitments” is that phrase is used casually in newspaper articles. The more I think about it, that’s not as important given that emphasis is on nuclear posture. It seemed like the issue Steve was bringing up begs the question of how many of those 13 steps are consistent with a posture change.

Stables: I think its these non-prolif ideas that are more important. We could move towards things that would more accurately reflect more components of the disarm deal. A number of them relate to multilateral/bilateral ways we go about reducing the scope of the arguments.

Bellon: how many of those 13 steps can be accomplished if you have to change posture?

Kuswa: I think we should say “nuclear weapons posture” instead of “nuclear posture.”

Greta: From what we know of the posture from US reviews, it is quite broad.

Stables: One reason I’m not eager to specify the 13, they overlap, they’re not precise. Also, testing. We already have a cessation policy. The 13 steps is only a modifier, that second part isn’t standalone topical. It’s not a change from the status quo.

Bellon: The attractiveness of this topic is that its comparative nature without a specific referent makes it better in a world where the squo is likely to change.

Stables: I can’t imagine we will get to the swing this year and not have a US-Russia follow up START deal. I can’t imagine NU without a run-up to the NPT review.

Stables: questions?

Mancuso: This is really going to take the topic in the direction of non-proliferation which is fine with me personally. I will say that the people who wrote the topic would not want the topic to go strongly in that direction. They’ve said that to me.

Stables: Article 6 is about disarm. The core they wanted was the US to have to change its posture, arsenal size. The aff wouldn’t have anything in their plan that says “we’re consistent with the NPT” it would have to change force.

Greta: I agree that they expressed a desire for this not to be a non-proliferation topic, but I think the core would be to change nuclear posture. In terms of affs, the only place it deviates from the topic paper is it doesn’t allow RRW and modernization type affs. I got the feeling there was a lot of opposition to including that.

Galloway: If you could disarm, which I think should be a litmus test, can you disarm, can you do CTBT. I don’t understand the distinction, it has to be a change in the US nuclear arsenal. You couldn’t do Nunn-Lugar for example.

Mancuso: I’m sold on that. A bigger concern I have is if we adopt the 13 steps as a guiding principle. Does anybody know what the trilateral agreement between US, Russia, and IAEA is? It’s number 8. The point I was trying to make was that if we go this route we have a lot of work to do. 13 is a poison pill: it says development of further verification. Somebody opposed to arms control would say we’re already adhering to 13, it was put in as a way to pacify conservative countries like the US at the time to make it look like we’re in tune with concerns over verification. That it has its own step concerns me that it gives some ground, the aff would have this T grounding because there’s the wording in 13 steps. I liked Greta’s topic last year a lot, but we’re starting at a much further behind place if we write a res that says you’re topical if you do one of these 13 things.

Greta: I don’t disagree that there are things we don’t know about. I don’t think including step 13 allows those things. Actions that change nuclear posture, if they meet that definition, would include that anyway. 13 steps, while broad, is still an effective limit. I don’t think it allows more than the wordings we had at the beginning.

Stables: I'd like to introduce Sean Lowry, the student representative. Today, let's go over our "homework" from last night and save the rebuttals and clean up for tomorrow.

The google doc is up with current wordings, and people can follow along there.

Galloway: I didn't find a distinction between obligation and commitment. Perkovich and others use them interchangably. Substantial compliance is not a term of art.

Sub debate over warrants for referencing the NPT and 13 steps: Gordon and I couldn't think of any topical aff areas outside this that also did not fall under the 13 steps.

Galloway: actions that are reversible aren’t topical, which is a pretty good T interpretation underneath this. They said that SORT was reversible because it had an escape hatch. On p. 14 I found a strange card that cites the Vienna convention, specifically references NPT. We have commitments under it, even if politicians say we don’t.

Galloway: Last little bit, whether you could be substantially consistent or compliant with. I found a card that substantially meant “good faith” in this context. I thought that was a good limit. Conclusion: I think a resolution that referenced disarm commitments or Article 6 and the 13 steps would be just fine.

Greetings folks, we're live at the 2009 Topic Meetings with your host for the morning, the illustrious William Richards Sears IV. Due to some technical difficulties, the updates from this morning might be a little jumbled, but hopefully you won't have too much trouble following along.

btw, GINGER POWER!

fyi - manc is defending "missions," greta worried that "missions" isn't a term of art used by solvency authors advocating cuts in the arsenal.