

MISSION CARDS

Joint Chiefs of Staff 1989

JCS Pub 1-02 “The Military Dictionary”

Mission (NATO) 1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. 2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 1989

JCS Pub 1-02 “The Military Dictionary”

Mission-essential materiel (DOD) 1. That materiel which is authorized and available to combat, combat support, combat service support, combat readiness training forces to accomplish their assigned missions. 2. For the purpose of sizing organic industrial facilities, that Service-designated materiel authorized combat, combat support, combat service support and combat readiness training forces and activities, including Reserve and National Guard activities, which is required to support approved emergency and/or war plans, and where the materiel is used to: a. destroy the enemy or his capacity to continue war, b. provide battlefield protection of personnel; c. communicate under war conditions d. detect, locate or maintain surveillance over the enemy e. provide combat transportation and support of men and materiel; and f. support training functions but is suitable for employment under emergency plans to meet purposes enumerated above.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 1989

JCS Pub 1-02 “The Military Dictionary”

Mission type order (DOD) - 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished.

The distinction between counterforce and counter-value targeting is blurry, because the use of a large number of nuclear weapons renders the intentions behind targeting irrelevant. The decision to employ a particular targeting strategy in actual fact would occur in the context of a crisis, and the counterforce/counter-value distinction would hinge on technical arcane like whether the US used airburst or groundburst settings. This evidence is from the country's top political science journal and its leading realist deterrence theorist.

Waltz, K. N. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities" September 1990, American Political Science Review v.84 i.3

<http://www.bowdoin.edu/~dsilbey/hist222/articles/deterrence-waltz.pdf>

"Nitze's fear rested on the distinction between counterforce strikes and countervalue strikes - strikes aimed at weapons and strikes aimed at cities. Because the Soviet Union's first strike would be counterforce, any U.S. president would seemingly have good reason to avoid retaliation, thus avoiding the loss of cities still held hostage by the Soviet Union's remaining strategic forces. **But this thought overlooks the fact that once strategic missiles numbered in the low hundreds are fired, the counterforce-countervalue distinction blurs. One would no longer know what the attacker's intended targets might be. The Soviet Union's counterforce strike would require that thousands, not hundreds of warheads be fired. Moreover, the extent of their casualties, should we decide to retaliate, would depend on how many of our warheads we chose to fire, what targets we aimed at, and whether we used ground bursts to increase fallout.** Several hundred warheads could destroy either the United States or the Soviet Union as ongoing societies. The assumptions made in the effort to make a Soviet first strike appear possible are ridiculous.

There's no way to establish the status quo, except by speculating – the actual US targets are classified. This confines debate to the theoretical, means there is no political reaction to the Aff, and including this in the topic reaches from the world of political management into the operational level of nuclear planning.

The operational level of command creates a dilemma for the Aff. Either it:

- A. Fiats implementation at the level of individual targeters and operations planners working on the targeting plans or
- B. It can't make credible solvency claims, since there's no way for debaters or outside researchers to know if the presidential directives (which are classified in the status quo) are followed

Lortie, B. 2001

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2001 Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 22-29

Information about nuclear weapons is closely guarded, and information about the current U.S.

nuclear war plan—the “SIOP” or Single Integrated Operational Plan that dictates how those nuclear weapons would actually be used—has been all but impossible to come by.

And it's not just the public who can't get their hands on the SIOP—even members of Congress with security

clearances are not permitted a

look at the plans developed by Strategic Command targeters in Omaha.

The problem, says Janne Nolan, director of international programs at

the Century Foundation, is that “you have two worlds. You have the

world of the political management of nuclear weapons—the stated policies.

And you have the operational world, which is where the rubber really hits

the road in terms of how forces are organized and postured to be

launched in a crisis. Over time, these worlds became ever more separate.”

The SIOP problem

You might think that a senior U.S. senator—let's say the ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee—would be able to get straight answers about the SIOP. But that wasn't the case when Sen. Bob Kerrey of Nebraska asked for details about the targeting plan. Congress and the president are tasked by the Constitution with a vital role in determining

national security policy,

“but how can we provide the policy guidance that is needed,” the former senator asked last October in a letter to then–Defense Secretary William Cohen, “if we are not given the information we need to decide if our current course of action is the correct one?”

Specifically, Kerrey wanted a peek at the SIOP, which directs how U.S. nuclear forces will be used in any number of crises. One might assume it includes targets, population figures, force numbers, weapon specs, and so forth. But that would be a guess, since nobody outside a small military circle has seen it.

What started Kerrey and other members of the Senate Democratic Caucus on their quest for information was the Joint Chiefs' claim that the United States could not realistically reduce its number of nuclear warheads below 2,500. They asked: Why that magical number and not some other number? But their questions went unanswered.

So the senators approached Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information and a former Minuteman missile launch control officer, for his help.

“They wanted to know why the Joint Chiefs said they couldn't go below 2,500 warheads,” said Blair. “I explained it in terms of the war plan. We have 2,260 vital Russian

targets in the SIOP today. You obviously need a lot of weapons if you have that many targets.”

Next, the Democratic Caucus asked for a briefing from Strategic Command, inviting the Republicans to join them. On June 15, 2000, in the “vault” of the Capitol building, Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocum and Commander in Chief of Strategic Command Adm. Richard Mies presided over the first SIOP briefing

ever given to the full Congress. It did not go as expected.

“It was a very unhappy affair because they wouldn't answer the questions that were being posed,” said Blair.

Kerrey was also baffled by the constantly changing explanations—no

less than seven—given him as to why

Congress is not entitled to know the specific targeting decisions made by

Strategic Command (Stratcom) in Omaha. Even for those legislators

who might have access to the

Presidential

Directive that governs targeting,

the actual targeting plan is classified

beyond reach. Kerrey notes:

“As an elected representative of the people, every member of Congress

has an absolute need to know these details”; it is the only way to know

that the instructions of the Presidential

Directive are being followed.

The core controversy is counterforce vs. counter-value targeting. But including targeting explicitly in the topic runs the risk that debaters will focus on the intricacies of these doctrines rather than on their generalized application. For example, leadership decapitation and counter-command and control targeting is a subset of counterforce, as is the counter-conventional targeting. These Affs could claim increasingly narrow advantages and draw the negative into debates with very little external offense.

Lortie, B. 2001

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2001 Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 22-

Counterforce versus

countervalue

At the core of their questions were the two reigning theories of how to target nuclear weapons: “counterforce” versus “countervalue.”

Experts love to debate the intricacies of these theories, but basically a counterforce strategy targets an enemy’s forces. Countervalue strategy targets populated areas, mainly cities. When you’re talking about thousands of nuclear weapons—and the mass fires, fallout, and destruction that they can cause—the differences between counterforce and countervalue quickly begin to blur. Millions are going to die—instantly or over time—either way.

Another distinction is that a countervalue strategy requires fewer weapons.

When the primary purpose is to hold the lives of millions of people hostage, it takes relatively less nuclear fire power—much less.

On the other hand, if the strategy depends on knocking out an enemy’s nuclear forces, or conventional forces, or command and control centers (and on down the line), it takes many more weapons, because any logical military defensive strategy is going to include spreading weapons and key facilities around and fortifying them so they’re not all at risk from a single attack.

Anecdotal evidence supports the solvency problem – doctrine and planning guidance aren’t binding at the level of nuclear targeteers and operational planners.

Lortie, B. 2001

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An example of this kind of redundancy was discovered by Gen.

George Lee Butler shortly after he took command of Strategic Air Command in 1991. He already had doubts about the operational feasibility of the war plan, but when he saw for the first time how general presidential guidance is translated into actual targeting, he was appalled at what he found.

For example, of the 12,500 targets



then in the SIOP, reported the March 15, 1998, New York Times Magazine, one particular target was slated to be hit by 69 consecutive nuclear weapons. At the time, Blair speculated that the target might have been a deeply buried command post at Chekhov. It turned out, Blair later told the magazine, the target was the Pushkino radar facility on the outskirts of Moscow. Defying common sense, a defense contractor had somehow managed to conclude that the above-ground radar facility was resilient enough to require a 69-missile attack.

Including targeting

Lortie, B. 2001

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In the end, Nolan sees the NRDC project as helping to show that the numbers aren't magic, **that they are derived from particular assumptions and methodologies**. "I think it would be useful for reporters when they write about this topic that they'll understand some of the assumptions behind a number like 2,500. I think anything that helps you understand how operational practices affect nuclear policy—what we say and do about arms control—is a good thing. "It's a very arcane world," she concluded, "and this chisels at its 'sacred' nature."

"Our mission has always been to widen the debate and make our leaders reflect differently about these issues," said Norris. Ultimately, Norris and his colleagues advocate the adoption of a set of contingency nuclear war plans that do not target any country on a day-to-day basis. Instead, nuclear weapons would be handled more like conventional forces. In the event of hostilities with another nuclear state, forces would go on alert, the prelaunch status of missiles would be upgraded, and a plan would be drawn from preexisting guidance. That would alleviate the need for large numbers of weapons and defuse the implications that go with the ongoing targeting of specific counties.

Not just another face
in the crowd

Cochran believes the interactivity of their model will distinguish their project from the many other policy

projects out there. He also believes that if they can replicate closely what Stratcom is doing, people will pay attention. "There's a zillion people putting out policy papers that just stack up on your bookshelf," he says. Early on, NRDC established credibility in the arms control community by publishing its series of Nuclear Weapons Databooks, which detailed force numbers in way that had never before been revealed. "Until you pry open the secrecy it can be very hard to prevail in these arms control debates. This is the last big secret. We want to expose Stratcom's calculations and numbers so the public and Congress can understand the war plan and its implications."

Kunsman, E. A. MA, US National War College 1990 "The Utility of Strategic Nuclear Forces Through the PRism of Clausewitz's Observations on War"

This long quote on Clausewitz's identification of the center of gravity as the decisive point for defeat of the enemy is exceptionally important when pondering the utility of strategic nuclear forces for deterrence. Heated debate in the U.S. has for too long focused on abstract concern about the stabilizing or destabilizing consequences of deploying strategic nuclear forces either optimized for counterforce or countervalue missions, debate quite divorced from determining what type of force can best deter the Soviets. Clausewitz provides the framework (locating the Soviets' center of gravity for answering the question. Result: to be effective, U.S. strategic nuclear forces in addition to being optimized to survive a first strike must also be optimized to retaliate against Soviet military forces (the Soviet center of gravity). Thus, the U.S. must design accuracy into SLBMs, heavy bombers/ALCMs, and survivability plus accuracy into its ICBMs.

<http://press.princeton.edu.proxygw.wrlc.org/chapters/s7764.html>

Military Power:

Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

Stephen Biddle

exclude countervalue strategic bombing chiefly because its dynamics are well studied elsewhere ("counterforce" violence is directed against hostile military forces; "countervalue" violence is aimed at hostile populations, economic centers, or political leadership).²⁷ Purely countervalue bombing is also less common than many think--and much less successful. To date, almost all strategic bombing has blended countervalue coercion with military counterforce to reduce an opponent's ability to wage war.²⁸ The latter is within my scope and has provided the overwhelming bulk of strategic bombing's actual historical impact. Whatever its intent, the primary result of Allied strategic bombing in World War II was to reduce Germany's war-making capacity.²⁹ Countervalue strategic bombing in Korea and Vietnam failed to bring political concessions directly; where it succeeded it was by reducing the target states' ability to wage a counterforce war effort.³⁰ In the Gulf War, strategic bombing was mostly counter-force in intent; limited countervalue bombing aimed at coercing Saddam by threatening his hold on power failed.³¹ In Kosovo, NATO bombing combined countervalue strikes against Serbian leadership and economic infrastructure with counterforce missions against Serbian ground forces; Serbian concessions occurred only after NATO began preparations for a major land invasion of Kosovo.³² In Afghanistan, early hopes that bombing Taliban leadership targets would yield concession-proved unrealistic. Strategic bombing has thus shown little ability to succeed via countervalue coercion, and recent experience in Kosovo and Afghanistan gives little reason to expect change any time soon.

Wolfson, R. Nuclear Choices 2000

Nuclear Strategy

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Nuclear Choices: A Citizen's Guide to Nuclear Technology.

Could we win a nuclear war? That question is important if we believe deterrence might fail, for an affirmative answer implies the desirability of nuclear arsenals far in excess of those needed purely for deterrence. Today the world's leaders are in consensus that

nuclear war is not winnable, but that opinion has not always prevailed, even among those now in power. And many nuclear "doves" would argue that continuing technological advances and "modernization" of nuclear forces reveal a question for nuclear superiority among military planners, despite what political leaders may say.

Proponents of a counterforce strategy - including many nuclear "hawks" - reply with the same argument that derailed massive retaliation: that the threat of an all-out attack against population centers is too unbelievable to deter any aggression short of an initial all-out attack, so MAD cannot prevent more limited aggression. They argue instead that aggressive behavior - against the United States or elsewhere in the world - is best deterred if an adversary knows we can respond with a specific nuclear strike appropriate to the situation at hand, possibly including destruction of the adversary's own nuclear missiles. Counterforce proponents claim, too, that MAD is militarily ineffective, killing harmless civilians instead of destroying harmful weapons. Some of them add an ethical twist, arguing that it is immoral to hold civilians hostage to the threat of nuclear annihilation. Better, they say, to target weapons than human beings.

The double meaning of the acronym MAD is not lost on critics of assured destruction. But counterforce strategies have their own peculiar insanity, summarized in the acronym NUTS. Standing for nuclear utilization target selection, this term emphasizes that counterforce strategies may well result in actual use of nuclear weapons. But the distinctions between countervalue and counterforce and between the related but not quite synonymous MAD and NUTS are blurred, in part because the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons means that even a limited counterforce attack would claim millions of civilian lives and in part because the superpowers' huge nuclear arsenals make the threat of assured destruction very real no matter what the targeting strategy. Some would argue that as long as sizable nuclear arsenals persist, some form of MAD will ultimately serve to keep the nuclear peace.

Counterforce and countervalue strategies have distinctly different technological implications. Destruction of population centers does not require particularly accurate delivery, although it does demand penetration of an adversary's defenses. Nor does countervalue require fast delivery, since cities don't move. And a relatively "soft" city can be destroyed by a single large warhead or several smaller ones. Counterforce strategies, in contrast, make quite different demands on weapons technology. Many military targets do move: submarines submerge, missiles get launched, aircraft take off. Speed and surprise are essential in an effective counterforce attack. Destroying specific objects, especially hardened targets such as missile silos - calls for high-yield, accurate nuclear weapons with multiple warheads. Accuracy, speed, and multiple-warhead capability are thus the hallmarks of a counterforce arsenal.

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A SIOP FOR PERESTROIKA?

by

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Air University Press

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<https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1992/cadre/cpss-91-16c.pdf>

The general nuclear war plan of the United States exists to deter nuclear aggression. This plan-called the SIOP-Is the vehicle for applying nuclear strikes against the Soviet enemy. Our strategic nuclear forces and the SIOP deter aggression by having the capability to devastate the Soviet Union should that nation cause deterrence to fail. The SIOP is not a static plan. Changes in capability, constraints levied on it, evolving visions of what deters best, and presidential guidance all affect the plan.

Perestroika seeks to increase and enhance Soviet national power over the long term. It plans to accomplish this objective by introducing democratization within the Soviet Union and its former client states, reforming Soviet economic structures, improving superpower relations, and altering Soviet military capabilities. Thus, perestroika exerts pressure on each of the elements influencing the SIOP. That the SIOP will change is inevitable.¹ That we have the wisdom to structure those changes according to a shared vision of the role of nuclear force in the future is not. Unless we apprehend the essential element underpinning deterrence theory, share a vision of nuclear strategy with the Soviets, and restructure our forces and plans to be faithful to it, we will have passed the culminating point.

Existing superpower nuclear forces and plans do not seem to be consistent with declarations that nuclear wars must not be fought

and cannot be won. For example, the role of our strategic nuclear forces and the present SIOP is to deter first and defeat attack second.²⁷ The forces deter by having the capability at least to attempt to defeat an attack. To defeat an attack, sufficient bombers and missiles must survive a Soviet strike and then retaliate against the enemy. To ensure the survival of the retaliatory forces, we need bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles on alert. Such large and robust forces imply that a nuclear war could be fought.

Why the U.S. Navy went for Hard-Target Counterforce in Trident II: (And Why it Didn't Get There Sooner)

Author(s): Graham Spinardi

Source: *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 147-190

Published by: The MIT Press

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538868>

But this bureaucratic environment, taken alone, cannot explain why the FBM program did eventually move to emphasize hard target counterforce in Trident II. Bureaucratic self-interest may have slowed the move to hard-target capability in the FBM force, but it did not stop it. Bureaucratic politics by itself fails to account fully for the workings of the domestic "internal" world, and disregards the influence of the international "external" world.

Of course, the external world is not direct and unambiguous in its influence. Soviet behavior clearly did affect the increasing acceptance in the United States of the desirability of hard-target capability during the 1970s and the importance of putting some of it to sea for the first time. But the perception of US ICBM vulnerability was by no means an uncontroversial and self-evident fact; the case for it had to be argued. That it was made so effectively and that it was portrayed as requiring a US response in kind (rather than one aimed solely at reducing that vulnerability), cannot simply be explained by realism. What happens in the external world is important, but only in relation to what is happening in the internal one.

http://academic.reed.edu/poli_sci/resources/samples/review-nukes.pdf

Explaining Nuclear Force Levels: A Literature Review

Political Science Junior Qual

Brian Brooks

May 8, 2007

There are four basic categories of explanation for arsenal size: practical, military, organizational, and political. Practical factors include technical considerations, such as the design of warheads and availability of fissile material for bomb cores, and economic considerations. Military factors include doctrinal objectives, such as counterforce versus countervalue, and the requirements of nuclear capability; lethality, survivability, penetrativity, and connectivity (Perry 1984, 87-88). Organizational factors include bureaucratic politics, budget maximization, and the military-industrial complex. Finally, political factors include the obvious domestic and international arenas, as well as the role of perception. An effort has been made to separate these four factors, but interaction effects are very important. Some overlap is inevitable: military choices can justify political arguments, technical limitations can influence doctrine, or any other possible combination. Two (or more) factors may compete, but they can just as easily be complementary and mutually reinforcing, complicating any simple explanation.

While military concerns are important, more parochial concerns inevitably play a part. "Interservice rivalry" (Scowcroft 1984, 69) was an important factor "because each of the military services wanted to play a role in the US nuclear arsenal. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, analysts developed a more reasoned rationale for the nuclear 'triad'" (Woolf 2006a, 20). The first strategic nuclear delivery vehicles were bombers, but even after the deployment of ballistic missiles, "the Air Force has resisted any effort to eliminate the strategic bomber force; even without such resistance it is very difficult to eliminate a whole segment of the armed forces once it is well established" (Tsipis 1983, 159). The US nuclear forces in the 1950s saw a serious lack of coordination (Rosenberg 1986) between commanders tasked with drawing up target lists, and "consequently, targets were frequently covered in two or more target annexes" (Ball 1986, 58), leading to significantly inflated demands for warheads. This issue was only partially addressed in the 1960s, as Henry Kissinger observed "disputes about targets are usually settled by addition-permitting each service to destroy what it considers essential to its mission" (Ball 1983, 4). The US Air Force and Navy both pursued aggressive budget

maximization goals, lobbying for large numbers of ICBMs and nuclear submarines. Formal Air Force requests in the early 1960s were “usually for about 1,000 more [missiles] than the Defense Department was willing to authorize” (Ball 1980, 244), and it was only when the Air Force realized “that its case for more Minutemen was hopeless did it turn to MIRV as the only available option for increasing the number of warheads” (Greenwood 1975, 38-39). Similarly, “the Navy apparently made a move to get its goal of 45 submarines accepted by the Defense Department—it proposed a Polaris force of 50 submarines” (Ball 1980, 243). McNamara held the line at 41 submarines and 1,000 Minuteman missiles: strong forces can push for arsenal expansion, but there can be equally important forces limiting such growth

http://www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/MEPO/R_1061_1924_153_1007685.asp
Review of:

The United States Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual by David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, John A. Nagl, Sarah Sewall

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I have argued elsewhere (in *The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency*, a 2006 Cato Institute monograph) that American strategic culture is so hostile to the performance of successful counterinsurgency that we should avoid direct military intervention in foreign internal wars. We are no good at these kinds of wars, so why should we risk involvement in them except in situations of extreme necessity? I also believe the experience of the Iraq War will exert, for perhaps a decade or two, as chilling an effect on America's use of force abroad as did the Vietnam War. As there was a Vietnam syndrome, so too will there be an Iraq syndrome (see my “Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?” in the fall 2007 issue of the *Strategic Studies Quarterly*).

I am further persuaded that the Army will walk away from counterinsurgency after Iraq, just as it did after Vietnam. The new religion of “smart” counterinsurgency may be spreading among some of the Army's best and brightest officers, but it is unlikely to be internalized by the resource-preoccupied institutional Army. Even in Iraq, observes Sewall, “Nothing prevents the field manual's prescriptions from being ignored or even used to mask conduct that is counter to its precepts” (p. xxxvi). More to the point, conventional war remains the Army's cultural comfort zone, and it is a far more potent budgetary claim on resources, especially on big-ticket weapons programs, than the inglorious counterinsurgency mission.

What of the Iraq War itself? Will Counterinsurgency, now put into practice by Petraeus, make a difference? Surely, it is too early to tell, although one suspects that the new counterinsurgency may be four years too late and a couple of hundred thousand troops short. Operation Iraqi Freedom may have been doomed from the start by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's arrogant insistence on an invasion force too small to seize control of Iraq and by U.S. occupation proconsul L. Paul Bremer's mindless dissolution of Iraq's regular army. Even a favorable turn-around in the military situation would count for little in the end, absent the Iraqi government's resolution of such outstanding political issues as the distribution of power between the regions and the central government, de-Bathification reform, the sharing out of oil and oil revenue, the establishment of provincial election laws and provincial authorities, amnesty policy, militia disarmament, and evenhanded law enforcement by Iraqi security forces. Counterinsurgency, it is said, is 80 percent political and only 20 percent military. If that is so, then the heavy lifting in Iraq lies both ahead and out of our hands.

Counterinsurgency grasps the great lesson that the Pentagon failed to learn in Vietnam and, unfortunately, may forget after Iraq:

Western militaries ...falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success - for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower - may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail (p. lii).

Counterinsurgency deserves a wide audience. Together with Steven Metz's *Rethinking Insurgency* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2007), it offers the reader acute insights into the nature of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency.

<https://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04autumn/ohanlon.htm>

Despite all the above laudable and promising initiatives, the Army— and perhaps the Marine Corps as well, but particularly the Army—needs an immediate increase in active-duty troop levels. In fact, the decision is overdue. At the latest, it should have been made as soon as it became obvious in mid-2003 that the post-Saddam Iraq stabilization mission would be difficult and long. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), it would take five years to fully train and recruit an additional 80,000 troops. (That would be enough for two divisions plus associated support. It would have an annual cost of about \$6.5 billion just to maintain the needed forces stateside—not counting marginal occupation-related costs or up-front investment costs, the latter estimated at just shy of \$20 billion.¹⁰) Even if CBO's methodology is too cautious, assuming a business-as-usual approach to recruiting and retention at a time when accelerated measures are called for, and even if it might take only half as long to add 40,000 troops, the time to act is now. That is because the period of maximum stress on Army personnel from the Iraq mission is likely to be this year through 2007. It is during these years when force totals will remain high and when units that have already deployed once to Iraq will have to return at least one more time.

So how does one determine the appropriate increased size of the Army? There is no definitive method because it is impossible to determine exactly how large a rotation base will be needed to continue the Iraq mission over a period of years while avoiding an unacceptable strain on the all-volunteer force that could drive large numbers of people out of the military. But logic and a basic sense of fairness suggest that we should not generally send active-duty troops back to Iraq after only a short respite at home between successive deployments. One year in Iraq, one year home, and then back for a year is extremely demanding—yet that is exactly what the Army will soon need to do with some units. While there is no way to prove that such a pace is excessive—at least not yet—it effectively turns soldiers into visitors in their own country. The short time spent at home is dominated by the period of recovery from a previous deployment and then preparation for the next deployment. Moreover, reservists should not have to be involuntarily activated more than once every five to six years, given the expectations those individuals have when joining the National Guard or Army Reserve.

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Though it is far from self-evident that an invasion force several hundred thousand strong would have succeeded in establishing the stability prerequisite for Iraq's political reconstruction, no OIF issue has drawn more fire from war opponents and proponents alike than the issue of underwhelming force.¹⁷ In the Gulf War of 1991, an attacking force three times the size of the OIF force was employed to achieve the very limited objective of driving Iraqi forces out of tiny Kuwait; 12 years later, in contrast, a comparatively small force was employed on behalf of the much more ambitious objective of seizing control of all of Iraq and providing the security necessary for that country's political transformation. The result in 1991 was a quick and cheap victory. The result in 2003 was the beginning of a costly, protracted, open-ended, and unpopular war that could culminate in a humiliating US withdrawal, Iraq's political disintegration, or both.

Metz 1995

http://www.cs.indiana.edu/sudoc/image_30000047651504/30000047651504/pdfdocs/jel/research/cntrinsr.pdf

COUNTERINSURGENCY:

Strategy and the Phoenix
of American Capability
Steven Metz

As during the Kennedy administration, high-level attention and the existence of a strategic rationale energized the military. For instance, by the late 1970s counterinsurgency had become a "non-subject" in the military educational system.³⁶ In

the 1980s, it was reintroduced with systematic attempts to integrate the lessons of Vietnam. The Army's Special Warfare Center, the School of the Americas, and the Air Force's Special Operations School expanded their offerings on counterinsurgency. Eventually the Navy added a program on low-intensity conflict at its Postgraduate School sponsored by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The services created "proponency offices" to coordinate thinking and education on low-intensity conflict.³⁷ The Army and Air Force established a Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (AAFCLIC) at Langley AFB. Army Special Operations Forces and the foreign area officer program, both major contributors to counterinsurgency support operations, grew. The Senate Armed Services Committee, a particularly strong advocate of organizational change, forced the Department of Defense to name an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low-Intensity Conflict and Special Operations (ASDSOLIC) and create USSOCOM. Recognizing the need for coherent strategy and policy, the Senate panel urged the National Security Council to form a low-intensity conflict board.³⁸ The Central Intelligence Agency also augmented its covert action capability which includes support to counterinsurgency.³⁹

The explosion of thinking and debate about low-intensity conflict was even more important than institutional reform. A number of serving and former government officials, retired officers, and analysts at government-related think-tanks began to write on low-intensity conflict.⁴⁰ Articles on counterinsurgency returned in force to military publications such as *Military Review*, *Parameters*, and *Marine Corps Gazette* after a decade-long hiatus. The Department of Defense and the military services sponsored major studies and workshops.⁴¹ Congress held hearings.⁴² As a result, a working consensus on appropriate post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine eventually emerged

Continues...

Conceptual expansion should be the first step. The definition of insurgency itself must be expanded to reflect the complexity of the new security environment. The first post-Cold War revision of FM 100-20--now called *Operations Other Than War*--recognizes the variegation of insurgency that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union. While continuing to emphasize Maoist "people's war," it pays greater attention to urban and subversive insurgency than its predecessors. It also stresses that U.S. neutrality in insurgencies "will be the norm." The new doctrine argues that "Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support."⁸⁹ There are two problems with this. First, it does not offer practical advice on the spiritual and psychic dimensions of legitimacy. Americans often assume that legitimacy arises solely from the provision of tangible goods and services and thus overlooks the importance of spiritual and psychic fulfillment. Second, the current American approach to counterinsurgency as evinced in existing doctrine is accurate for forms of insurgency that seek to seize power by mobilizing greater support than the regime, but offers little guidance for confronting gray area phenomena, "irrational" enemies for whom violence is not a means to political ends, or what Ralph Peters calls "the new warrior class"--"erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order."⁹⁰ In a study that brilliantly captures changes in the global security environment, Hans Magnus Enzensberger writes, Nothing remains of the guerrilla's heroic halo. Once ideologically armed to the teeth and exploited by their



shadowy backers, today's guerrillas and anti-guerrillas have become self-employed. What remains is the armed mob. All the self-proclaiming armies of liberation, people's movements and fronts degenerate into marauding bands, indistinguishable from their opponents...What gives today's civil wars a new and terrifying slant is the fact that they are waged without stakes on either side, that they are wars about nothing at all.⁹¹

For American counterinsurgents, this is a sea change. As John Keegan points out, cultures with a Clausewitzian belief in the connection of war and politics often have difficulty comprehending--much less defeating--opponents with other motives.⁹² The job of experts in the military and defense community is to help overcome this. Some movement in this direction has taken place. New joint doctrine, for instance, states that foreign internal defense "has traditionally been focused on defeating an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government," but in the future "may address other threats" such as civil disorder, narcotrafficking and terrorism

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which "may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue."⁹³ To transcend the conceptual limits of the Cold War, insurgency should be considered simply protracted, organized violence which threatens security and requires a government response, whether revolutionary or nonrevolutionary, political or nonpolitical, and open or clandestine.