

Solvency mechanism for a QPQ aff with North Korea that offers to limit our nuclear weapons in exchange for North Korea giving up the bomb

Back off of our first use pledge or offer North Korea a security guarantee

Commit to pullout our tactical nuclear weapons or our deployments

## US taking steps towards denuclearization needed for resolution with North Korea

**Korea Report, '9** (June 4, "New US Strategy Towards North Korea Needed"  
<http://koreareport2.blogspot.com/2009/06/new-us-strategy-towards-north-korea.html>)

With North Korea's second nuclear weapon testing and test-lanching of several missiles, and its announcement that the Korean War armistice is void, and the response of South Korea joining the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (which North Korea considers an act of war), things are spiralling down to another escalation of tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Rather than contemplating military approaches to the current situation, all sides should think about diplomatic breakthrough that will avert another catastrophical conflict in the peninsula. Among those who favor this approach is Leon Sigal, a former State Department official who has visited North Korea with Korea experts and scholars. His main arguments in an article, "Punishing North Korea Won't Work," from the Bulletin of Concerned Atomic Scientists are: -- Despite Monday's nuclear test, the latest North Korean nuclear crisis really began last June, when the Bush administration began unilaterally rewriting an agreement with North Korea. -- During her February trip to the region, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went out of her way to antagonize North Korea in order to reassure Japan and South Korea. -- Sustained diplomatic give-and-take that holds out a new political, economic, and strategic relationship between Washington and Pyongyang would be a more productive strategy. ... The only way to do so [denuclearization of North Korea] is to probe through sustained diplomatic give-and-take. That requires offering meaningful steps toward a new political, economic, and strategic relationship-including diplomatic recognition, a summit meeting, a peace treaty to end the Korean war, negative security assurances, and a multilateral pledge not to introduce nuclear weapons into the Korea Peninsula as well as other benefits to its security, agricultural and energy assistance, and conventional power plants if possible or nuclear power plants if necessary. In return the United States would get steps toward full denuclearization.

## US has to reduce its nuclear threat to North Korea in order for them to give up nuclear weapons

**Richardson, '9** (Neil, June 3, "Korea War - Round 2 part 2" Sic Semper Tyrannis,  
[http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic\\_semper\\_tyrannis/2009/05/korea-war-round-2-part-2-.html?cid=6a00d8341c72e153ef01156fc9bda4970c](http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/05/korea-war-round-2-part-2-.html?cid=6a00d8341c72e153ef01156fc9bda4970c))

The negotiating positions taken by North Korea can be summarized as follows: —North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons in return for normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States and economic aid from the United States. Normalization of relations must come before denuclearization as a step toward denuclearization.<sup>27</sup> North Korean officials rejected Selig Harrison's proposal that North Korea turn over its plutonium stockpile to the International Atomic Energy Agency in return for U.S. diplomatic recognition and U.S. economic aid and trade credits. They asserted to Harrison that North Korea wanted U.S. recognition of its status as a nuclear weapons state.<sup>28</sup> —North Korea no longer has a plutonium stockpile of 31 kilograms that it declared in June 2008 because North Korea has "weaponized" all of its plutonium. This implies a North Korea position that future negotiations on final denuclearization must deal only with North Korea's plutonium atomic weapons.<sup>29</sup> — Denuclearization must include the entire Korean peninsula and must include the elimination of the "U.S. nuclear threat" to North Korea.<sup>30</sup> Pyongyang's apparent position that a final denuclearization negotiation must deal only with its atomic weapons appears to aim at giving North Korea more negotiating leverage to press its demand that the United States must agree to measures to eliminate the U.S. "nuclear threat." North Korea repeatedly has defined the "U.S. nuclear threat" to include the composition and major operations of U.S. military forces in South

Korea and around the Korean peninsula and the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” over South Korea embodied in the U.S.-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. North Korean strategy seems aimed at proposing that a final denuclearization agreement with the United States constitute the document that regulates the future U.S. military presence in and around the Korean peninsula, thus superseding the U.S.-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. —Any system of verification and inspections must include inspections inside South Korea, including U.S. bases in South Korea. If North Korea holds to that position, negotiating an agreement on verification that would include sampling would pose additional difficulties and likely delays. These negotiating positions, plus earlier positions laid out by Pyongyang, suggest that North Korea might assert that the next round of nuclear negotiations should focus on only an agreement for the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon installations.<sup>31</sup> Pyongyang likely will assert that negotiations over its nuclear weapons should be postponed until a later phase of the six party talks or that the issue be negotiated in separate U.S.-North Korean bilateral negotiations. Pyongyang also may take the position that verification procedures, especially inspections and sampling, must be dealt with in this later, denuclearization phase of negotiations.

### **North Korea wants mutual reductions in nuclear arms**

**Bradbury**, Policy Innovations, ‘9 (Mikaela, June 4, “Options on DPRK: Bad and Worse” <http://fairerglobalization.blogspot.com/2009/06/options-on-dprk-bad-and-worse.html>)

With respect to potential causes of North Korea's recent behavior, Dr. Cha advocated the most simple explanation: North Korea is developing a nuclear weapons program because it wants a nuclear weapons program and part of the nuclear club. Blaming U.S. policy for North Korean hostilities is no longer valid, both in light of Bush's last minute deal with North Korea, and in light of the Obama administration's willingness to participate in high-level negotiations. The question of "what North Korea wants" has confounded policy analysts for years. Problematically, Dr. Cha explained, many of the things people claim North Korea desires has already been offered them. And the two things that North Korea is really after, according to Cha, the United States can't give them. More specifically, North Korea is set on being a nuclear state, and acquiring an agreement with the United States similar to the one India got in October 2008. Ironically, Cha speculated, once given that status, the DPRK would likely engage in mutual nuclear reduction negotiations.

### **US has to guarantee regime security for North Korea to give up its weapons**

**Stares**, General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention and Director of the Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, ‘9 (Paul, “The North Korean Puzzle: The Succession Question” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/19507/>)

Second, to the extent that further diplomatic initiatives toward North Korea are going to be successful, they must adjust for the likelihood that the nuclear weapons program is being driven primarily out of considerations of "regime survival" as distinct from national security. Thus it may not be simply enough to signal that the United States has "no hostile intent" toward North Korea but rather it may be necessary to consider active measures to reassure the Kim family regime of its future. Any moral reservations about doing this have to be weighed against the larger goal of denuclearization. The Libyan precedent is instructive in this regard.

### **US has no good choice for dealing with North Korea**

**Kang**, Director, Korean Studies Institute, University of Southern California, ‘9 (David, “The North Korea Puzzle: Economic Leverage” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/19507/>)

The sad fact is that the range of policy options available to the Obama administration and other governments in the region are quite thin. Few countries would consider military action to cause the regime to collapse for fear that collapse would bring even greater instability and potentially unleash uncontrolled nuclear weapons. At the same time, few countries are willing to normalize relations and offer considerable economic or diplomatic incentives to North Korea in the hopes of luring

Pyongyang into moderation. As a result, the Obama administration is left with the choices of rhetorical pressure, quiet diplomacy (either bilateral or multilateral), and mild sanctions.

### **Bilateral agreement not enough to solve North Korea crisis**

**Pritchard**, President, Korea Economic Institute, former ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea from 2001-2003, **'9** (Charles, "The North Korea Puzzle: Diplomatic Engagement" Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/19507/>)

The history of the last fifteen years in dealing with North Korea suggests that it is a bilateral approach between the United States and North Korea that has worked the best, that has produced the most results in the shortest period of time. That is not to diminish the important role of multilateral talks. However, to date, the multilateral approach has not produced the desired results. Even those who would point to some modicum of success in the Six-Party Talks would acknowledge that it came about through truly bilateral meetings between the United States and North Korea in January 2007 in Berlin, and then later in Singapore in the fall of 2007. Appropriately, the results of those meetings were then codified in the Six-Party process. Pyongyang was a reluctant partner which preferred not to participate in the multilateral setting, if given a choice. Without regard to the efficacy of the bilateral approach, the North Korean nuclear issues have regional and international implications that require the participation and buy-in of more than just the United States. What this suggests is that we've got to find a way in which to make the multilateral setting work as a matter of routine. Bilateral meetings will continue to perform an important role, but the ultimate solution to the North Korea nuclear problem requires a multilateral solution.

### **Policy for North Korea arms limitation negotiations**

**International Crisis Group**, **'4** (November 15, "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks" <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3101&l=1>)

It is time to change tack and put a comprehensive offer on the table that lays out exactly what benefits North Korea stands to get in exchange for giving up its nuclear program and weapons. Only a serious offer from the United States will put the other parties in a position to increase pressure on North Korea should a reasonable deal be rejected. Before the talks began in August 2003, ICG outlined a phased negotiating strategy, designed to tackle the most immediate threat -- North Korea's reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods and the restarting of the reactors that would allow it to produce more -- before addressing the details of verification, dismantlement and economic incentives.[1] Acknowledging that diplomacy is the best option but that success was not assured, the strategy involved an initial freeze, followed by detailed time-limited negotiations backed by sanctions if those negotiations failed. It also accepted the possibility of military force should North Korea cross a red line by preparing to use or transfer nuclear weapons. It is now too late to freeze North Korea's activities at its nuclear plant at Yongbyon: it must be assumed that by now the fuel rods there previously subject to safeguards have been reprocessed and their fissile material already turned into weapons. Future talks must deal with three areas of concern -- first, eliminating such weapons as were produced before 1994; secondly, eliminating such weapons as have been produced from plutonium reprocessed after 2002 and fully accounting for that plutonium and the spent fuel now continuing to be generated in the Yongbyon reactor; and thirdly, verifiably dismantling the program, such as it is, to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU). The focus should remain on the nuclear issue, putting on hold other current policy concerns such as missile controls, human rights, reductions of conventional forces and economic reforms, important as they all are in their own right, until this critical problem is resolved. North Korea is only likely to respond to a mix of economic and security inducements backed by the threat of coercive measures such as sanctions. China, Russia and South Korea, however, are very reluctant to impose sanctions on the North, while Japanese steps in this direction have been driven more by the issue of North Korea's kidnapping of its citizens than concerns over the nuclear program. There will be no agreement on coercive measures unless the United States (after consultation with its other negotiating partners) first lays out a detailed plan of what North

Korea can expect by way of economic assistance and security guarantees. A road map going no further than indicating the general direction of the process, indicating what might be discussed when, is not likely to be enough to persuade the North Koreans and the other participants that the U.S. is negotiating in good faith: what is also needed is a detailed picture of the destination. This report outlines an eight-stage process under which North Korea would reveal and dismantle various components of its nuclear program while receiving a series of economic, energy and security benefits. The steps would be laid out in advance so that it would be clear if any participant was not living up to its obligations. By the end of this process, North Korea would have given up all its nuclear programs; in return it would have diplomatic relations with Japan and exchanged liaison offices with the United States. It would receive a significant input of energy assistance and aid from South Korea, Japan and the European Union. It would also have a conditional multilateral security guarantee. Having given up its weapons, it would be in a position to move forward with full diplomatic relations with the U.S., sign a peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula, and develop full relations with international financial institutions. North Korea's perceived threats to its economic and military security would be significantly reduced. Any agreement will have to take into account a number of realities. A deal will only be possible if it includes intrusive verification. There is little willingness in the U.S. Congress to fund more aid to North Korea; therefore, Japan and South Korea will have to bear significant costs. And it is doubtful that the United States will accept any form of peaceful nuclear energy program in North Korea, meaning that plans to build light water reactors under KEDO may have to remain suspended indefinitely. Talks with North Korea are never easy. There is some scepticism that Pyongyang will ever accept a deal, however objectively reasonable. The only way to find out once and for all is to offer it one that at least all five other parties see as such. And that will require more being put on the table than has been the case so far.

RECOMMENDATIONS To the United States:

1. Present (after consultation with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia) a detailed proposal fully outlining the steps North Korea will need to take to dismantle its weapons programs together with a clear picture of what economic benefits and security guarantees will be offered if they do, with elements along the following lines:
  - (a) security guarantees for verified freeze of Yongbyon operation;
  - (b) energy planning for disclosures and declarations of intent;
  - (c) energy provision for signatures and access;
  - (d) rehabilitation and relief for agreed dismantlement;
  - (e) aid for dismantlement;
  - (f) reparations for weapons declarations;
  - (g) liaison office and international financial institution preparations for HEU commitments; and
  - (h) liaison offices for conclusive verification.
2. Be prepared itself to provide, at the appropriate times, the following components of any such deal:
  - (a) a conditional security guarantee (along with Russia, China, South Korea and Japan);
  - (b) support for delivery to North Korea of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year by South Korea and Japan;
  - (c) participation in a multilateral energy survey of North Korea, including preparations for the rehabilitation of power plants;
  - (d) agreement to technical assistance from the World Bank and others;
  - (e) relaxation of travel restrictions on North Korean diplomats and the exchange of liaison offices; and
  - (f) review of North Korea's inclusion on the list of terrorism sponsors.
3. Agree to the continued suspension of the KEDO program rather than pressing for its abandonment, and postpone a decision on its future until after implementation of a deal is well underway.
4. Draw up a plan of graduated sanctions, to be backed by a possible UN resolution, should North Korea not accept a reasonable package or violate an eventual agreement.
5. Recognise that issues such as terminating North Korea's missile program and exports, human rights, economic reform, biological and chemical weapons, and conventional force reductions should not form part of the nuclear negotiations.