

## Day 3: Working Group #2 Recommendation

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## Working Group #2 Recommendation

Our sub-group moderately recommends the inclusion of one ballot item (Kuswa: a 6 or 7 out of 10). We would like the committee to discuss which of these resolutions best fits one ballot item.

**2.1(a) R: The USFG should substantially reduce and restrict the missions, role and/or size of its nuclear weapons arsenal.**

(Rationale: creates the merged mission/role hybrid, allows possibility that topic would be interpreted as unilateral only as per Josh Hoe email last night)

**2.1(b) R: The USFG should substantially reduce and restrict the role and/or size of its nuclear weapons arsenal.**

(Rationale: We both still express concern about addition of missions—missions seem to be more tactical, creating potential for small affirmatives: whereas role is strategic, creating broader changes to deterrence doctrine. Potentially unilateral as per Josh Hoe email).

**2.1(c) R: The USFG should substantially reduce and restrict the missions and/or size of its nuclear weapons arsenal.**

(Rationale: If the committee prefers missions to role, this option allow that. Potentially unilateral as per Josh Hoe email).

**2.2(a) R: The USFG should substantially reduce and restrict the missions, role and/or size of its nuclear weapons arsenal through unilateral and/or international initiatives.**

(Rationale: creates the merged mission/role hybrid, allows possibility that topic would be bilateral or multilateral).

**2.2(b) R: The USFG should substantially reduce and restrict the missions, role and/or size of its nuclear weapons arsenal through unilateral and/or international initiatives.**

(Rationale: Role only + allows bilateral/multilateral).

**2.3(c) R: The USFG should substantially reduce and restrict the missions, and/or size of its nuclear weapons arsenal through unilateral and/or international initiatives.**

(Rationale: Missions only + allows bilateral/multilateral).

## Question 1: What is Topical?

Affs that should be topical	2: Missions, Role, Size
Unilateral cuts (including to zero)	Yes
Targeting doctrine	Yes
Declaratory policy (NFU, Retaliation)	Yes
De-alerting	Yes
CTBT ratification	Yes
START follow on agreement	Yes
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) (Does not deal with the role, size, or mission)	?ble
Nuclear weapons complex – the science of making weapons (testing could be part)	No

Does this violate the intent of the authors? No—FMCT not in original topic paper. Only reference is in the 13 steps, which discusses the FMCT.

### *FMCT is questionably topical—*

**it is not discussed in either our role evidence or our missions evidence: it merely caps fissile material for use in weapons and places safeguards on quantities of plutonium and uranium used.**

Oxford Research Group, FMCT Handbook,

<http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/books/pdf/fmctch1.pdf>

Of these, a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is an urgent measure for several reasons. As a minimum an FMCT would:

- Cap the amount of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons by banning any further production for weapon purposes;
- Place international safeguards and verification arrangements on all facilities that produce significant quantities of plutonium and uranium that could be used in nuclear weapons;
- Lead to the development of effective fissile material regulatory systems in the eight declared and de facto nuclear-weapon powers. As a result of these two steps, an FMCT could also

- Restart negotiations on further multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament measures;
- Help control the proliferation of fissile materials from which nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives can be fabricated; and
- Help reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.

## Question 2: Reduce and Restrict (Verb Action)

### Reduce and restrict is the right way to frame the resolution.

#### *“Reduce and restrict” specific to arms control:*

#### Specific evidence discussing reduce and restrict in the context of TNW’s and the effort to reduce the number and limit the size:

Charles L. Thornton, 2006 (47<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention International Studies Association, March 22-25, 2006,

[http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/1/0/0/9/1/pages100913/p100913-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/0/9/1/pages100913/p100913-1.php))

In 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union issued unilateral, but very similar declarations to reduce and restrict elements of their tactical nuclear weapons. Russia reiterated and expanded its commitments in 1992. This, as former Russian arms control diplomat and current senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies Nikolai Sokov put it, “Was a relatively rare time when the objectives and interests of the two countries with regard to TNWs coincided almost perfectly.”<sup>1</sup> The arms control community welcomed these initiatives, but since they have never been formalized there remains little transparency into the reductions and limitations themselves. This report is based on the following series: Gunnar O. Arbman and Charles L. Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons – Part I: Background and Policy Issues, Defense Research Agency (Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut, FOI), Swedish Ministry of Defense, Report # FOI-R--1057--SE, ISSN 1650-1942, November 2003.

#### In the context of START meaning to reduce and limit:

K.P. Waran, 2000, New Straits Times, (April 3, 2000, “Time for nations to push for the elimination of nuclear weapons,” Online, Nexis.

Start I, signed in 1991, permits Washington and Moscow to maintain 6,000 strategic warheads on bombers, submarines and land-based missiles. The 1993 Start II agreement would reduce that limit to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads. Neither treaty restricts the number of warheads kept in reserve.

#### In the context of nuclear arms control:

Federation of American Scientists, Public Interest Report, Fall 2008,  
([http://www.fas.org/pubs/pir/\\_docs/Fall\\_2008\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.fas.org/pubs/pir/_docs/Fall_2008_FINAL.pdf))

“I am strongly opposed to the deal that the Bush administration made with India, which overturns almost 40 years of restrictions,” said Joseph Cirincione. “We banned the export of nuclear technology to countries that had not signed up to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and were not part of global efforts to reduce and restrict nuclear weapons.

**Reduce and restrict used in the context of arms control regimes to control conventional weapons:**

Francis Chiappa, Peace Action Policy on Real Security,  
([www.peaceactioncleveland.org/resourcesmodule/download\\_resource/id/29/src/@random468aa95a20589/](http://www.peaceactioncleveland.org/resourcesmodule/download_resource/id/29/src/@random468aa95a20589/))

Reduce and restrict the conventional weapons trade; support a code of conduct regulating all arms transfers: The US is the world's number one arms supplier and September 11 only increased US arms sales. The US has sold arms to regimes of all kinds, often fueling conflicts from both sides. We believe the US should end arms sales to the Middle East and to the developing world. It should stop arming the likes of Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, as it did for narrow foreign policy interests in the past.

***Non arms control uses of the term:***

**Financial aid cuts are reduced and restricted:**

**Legislative Analyst's Office, 2009**

**([http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis\\_2009/highered/highered\\_anl09003002.aspx](http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2009/highered/highered_anl09003002.aspx))**

Alongside proposed fee increases of about 10 percent at the universities, the Governor proposes to reduce and restrict state financial aid programs. Given that student fees are low by national standards, we think increasing fees is a sensible way to provide resources to the segments in lieu of General Fund support. In order to ensure that fee increases do not prevent higher education access for financially needy students, however, the state would need to increase, rather than reduce, funding for its financial aid programs. Instead, the Governor proposes to reduce funding for the state's Cal Grant programs by \$87.5 million from the level that would be required under current program rules. We think this reduction is unwise, as it undermines financial aid expectations that the state has carefully established, and on which students and their families have come to rely.

**Membership numbers are reduced and restricted:**

**St. Petersburg Times, 1993 (December 3, 1993; Lexis)**

Senior U.S. officials said the Clinton administration wanted to open the door to almost any European nation that might want to join, including countries such as Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. But other NATO officials said many European members of the alliance wanted to restrict membership, perhaps to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. European efforts to reduce potential membership focused on Ukraine, which has angered the United States and its allies by refusing to get rid of the powerful nuclear arsenal that it inherited from the Soviet Union. The Kiev government agreed almost two years ago to scrap the nuclear weapons and sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. But the Ukrainian Parliament has balked at ratifying the treaty.

**Individuals frequently reduce and restrict food intake:**

Allan N. Schwartz, 2006 LCSW, PhD on Wed, Dec 27th 2006

([http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view\\_doc.php?type=weblog&id=139&wlid=5&cn=46](http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=weblog&id=139&wlid=5&cn=46))

Individuals, who become anorectic, usually begin by attempting to lose some weight. Immediate success in weight loss produces a feeling of exhilaration and power that spurs the individual to increased efforts to reduce and restrict food intake and lose weight.

**Reducing and restricting the use of plastic bags**

**Reuters, 5/27/2008 (accessed at: <http://www.seattlebagtax.org/nwepseminar.html>)**

Fact Box-Plastic not Fantastic?; Bag bans around the world, Reuters, May 27, 2008. (accessed June 10, 2008).

Reuters reports China's outlaw of ultra-thin plastic bags to take action on June 1, 2008. China is taking action in effort to reduce pollution and increase resources. Reuters provides are descriptions of other countries current actions being taken to

**reduce and restrict the use of plastic bags;** included is San Francisco, CA's

**Reduce and restrict in the context of providing homeless shelter and services:**

Patrick **Markee and Lindsey Davis**, Coalition for the Homeless, 2008 (December 15, 2008  
[http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/plans\\_to\\_reduce\\_shelter.html](http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/plans_to_reduce_shelter.html))

In order to truly reduce the numbers of homeless individuals on our streets, Mayor Bloomberg and his administration should immediately halt plans to **reduce and restrict shelter and services** for street homeless New Yorkers and should halt plans to move the homeless men's intake center out of Manhattan.

### Question 3: Missions and/or Roles

OK, we've hashed this out for two days. It seems the primary distinction is tactical versus strategic. Missions allows in the more tactical affirmatives like "the smelting plant in Smolensk..."

More seriously, it allows in affirmatives like the "ban the potential to tactically strike North Korea." Those may be good aff's, but combined mission & role may be very broad. Our working group would prefer splitting it up, and prefers role, but are willing to compromise with members of the committee who prefer the inclusion of both terms.

### Question 4: "International" is the correct term

#### *Findings*

##### **Finding:**

**Bilateral and Multilateral are NOT interchangeable. Both the dictionary definitions and the contextual evidence support this claim. If we use "multilateral" we must include "Bilateral" to allow one-on-one negotiations with Russia or China. If "Bilateral" is used the inclusion of a third party would not be topical.**

**"International" is inclusive of both and is used in the context of disarmament negotiations**

#### *Unilateral v. Bilateral v. Multilateral*

##### **----Definition comparing all 3**

**Wilson 93** [Kenneth G. Wilson, The Columbia Guide to Standard American English, 1993, pg. fhttp://www.bartleby.com/68/45/845.html.

bilateral, multilateral, unilateral (adjs.)

Bilateral means "two-sided, probably symmetrically so," as in His hearing loss was bilateral; it involved both ears. Unilateral means "one-sided, involving only one party, independent," as in She took unilateral action, not waiting to see whether her neighbors would decide to join her. Multilateral means "many-sided, involving many parties," as in They finally all agreed to sign a very complex multilateral commercial treaty. All these words are Standard.

### ---Juxtaposition of the 3 in the context of disarmament

**Burroughs 99** - Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy [John Burroughs, "Presentation to 1999 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2000 Review Conference, 11 May 1999, pg. <http://lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/multilateralforumsandinstruments.htm>]

Unilateral actions, jointly coordinated actions, and bilateral and plurilateral cooperation and negotiations are all important. But there must also be successful multilateral forums and instruments. Most states are aware of the pressing need for the creation of a forum or forums that explicitly have under consideration the institutional framework for a nuclear weapon free world and how to achieve it. There are several proposals for an ad hoc committee or working group in the Conference on Disarmament, including two originating from NATO member states. What these proposals have in common is that they recognize the validity of multilateral disarmament talks, if not outright negotiations.

## *Bilateral is Two Parties – Dictionaries*

### ----Bilateral = 2

**Free Dictionary** [pg. <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/bilateral>]

bi·lat·er·al (b-ltr-l)

adj.

1. Having or formed of two sides; two-sided.
- 2. Affecting or undertaken by two sides equally; binding on both parties: a bilateral agreement; bilateral negotiations.**
3. Relating to the right and left sides of the body or of a body structure.
4. Having or marked by bilateral symmetry.

### ----Bilateral = 2

**Medicine Net** [pg. <http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=9812>]

Bilateral: Having, or relating to, two sides. Bilateral is as opposed, for example, to unilateral (which means having, or relating to, one side).

## *Multilateral is more than Two Parties*

### ----Multilateral = more than 2

**Free Dictionary** [pg. <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/multilateral>]

mul·ti·lat·er·al (mlt-ltr-l)

adj.

1. Having many sides.
2. Involving more than two nations or parties: multilateral trade agreements.

### ----Multilateral = more than 2

**Merriam Webster** [<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/multilateral>]

\məl-tē-lā-t(ə)rəl, -tī\

- 1 : having many sides
- 2 : involving or participated in by more than two nations or parties <multilateral agreements>

----**Juxtaposed with bilateral**

**Business Dictionary** [pg. <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/multilateral-agreement.html>]  
multilateral agreement

Definition

Accord among three or more parties, agencies, or national governments. Such agreement between two such parties is called bilateral agreement.

## ***Multilateral v. Bilateral – Disarm context***

----**Obama Administration views bilateral and multilateral as different approaches. Iran proves**

**STRATFOR 09** ["U.S., Iran: Multilateral Dealings Now, Bilateral Dealings Later,"

March 5, 2009 | 1711 GMT pg. [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090305\\_u\\_s\\_iran\\_multilateral\\_dealings\\_now\\_bilateral\\_dealings\\_later](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090305_u_s_iran_multilateral_dealings_now_bilateral_dealings_later).

As part of its strategy of diplomatic engagement with Tehran's clerical regime, the Obama administration is waiting until after Iran's presidential vote in June to engage the Islamic republic on a **bilateral** level. But the U.S. administration already has begun to engage the Iranians in a **multilateral setting**, using the opportunity provided by the need for an international consensus on how to deal with Afghanistan. The Iranians will be delighted by this overture, as it is in keeping with their demand to be recognized by the Americans as a regional power. Tehran also has stated specifically that the Afghanistan problem cannot be solved without its involvement. While allowing the Iranians to make progress in their efforts to carve out a greater regional role, the U.S. invite also gives Tehran some time to sort out domestic political debates over how to deal with the United States on a broader level.

**North Korea proves**

**Guardian 03** ["Multilateral Arms Control and the Challenge of North Korea," June 11, 2003, pg.

[http://programs.ssrc.org/gsc/publications/multilateral\\_arms\\_control/moon.doc](http://programs.ssrc.org/gsc/publications/multilateral_arms_control/moon.doc)

Different modality of dialogue: The United States and North Korea have shown a parallel mode in choosing the modality of dialogue and negotiation. North Korea has strongly called for a direct **bilateral** talk with the United States. For North Korea, threats from the U.S. are real and pressing, and that the only way to manage them is to strike a direct deal with the United States. No other parties but the United States can guarantee the North of its security. Moreover, multilateral approach could be extremely time consuming and high in transaction costs.

However, the Bush administration is firm on this issue by pushing for multilateral approaches. It has been trying to utilize the United Nations Security Council as well as other **multilateral formula** in pressing the North to comply with the American mandate of "dismantle first, talk later." Secretary of State Colin Powell has straightforwardly rejected the idea of a direct, bilateral talk with the North by stating: "I think eventually we will be talking to North Korea, but we are not going to simply fall into what I believe is bad practice of the saying the only way you can talk to us is directly, when it affects other nations in the region."<sup>3</sup> The Bush administration prefers the multilateral approach not only because of its own face saving, but also because of its efforts to exert collective pressures of international community on North Korea.

## *International – Dictionaries*

### ---Between and among nations

**Dictionary.com** [pg. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/international>]

in⊕ter⊕na⊕tion⊕al

/ɪntərˈnæʃənəl/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [in-ter-nash-uh-nl] Show IPA

–adjective

1. **between or among nations; involving two or more nations:** international trade.
2. of or pertaining to two or more nations or their citizens: a matter of international concern.
3. pertaining to the relations between nations: international law.
4. having members or activities in several nations: an international organization.
5. transcending national boundaries or viewpoints: an international benefit; an international reputation.

### ---Two or more nations

**Answer.com** [pg. <http://www.answers.com/topic/international>]

International

adj. (Abbr. int. or intl.)

1. **Of, relating to, or involving two or more nations:** an international commission; international affairs.
2. Extending across or transcending national boundaries: international fame

### ---More than one

**InvestorWords.com** [pg. <http://www.investorwords.com/2567/international.html>]

international

Definition

Involving more than one country.

## *International – Disarm Negotiation Context*

Google search of “international negotiations” and “disarmament”

Results 1 - 10 of about 36,600 for "international negotiations" disarmament. (0.21 seconds)

### ---“International” within the context of disarmament

**Annan 06** – Former Secretary-General of the United Nations [Kofi Annan, “UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan Calls for Progress on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation,” [Disarmament Diplomacy](http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd83/83un.htm), Issue No. 83, Winter 2006, pg. <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd83/83un.htm>]

For all these reasons, I call on all the States with nuclear weapons to develop concrete plans - with specific timetables - for implementing their **disarmament commitments**. And I urge them to make a joint declaration of intent to achieve the progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons, under strict and effective international control.

In short, my friends, the only way forward is to make progress on both fronts - non-proliferation and disarmament - at once. And we will not achieve this unless at the same time we deal effectively with the threat of terrorism, as well as the threats, both real and rhetorical, which drive particular States or regimes to seek security, however misguidedly, by developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

It is a complex and daunting task, which calls for leadership, for the establishment of trust, for dialogue and negotiation. But first of all, we need a renewed debate, which must be inclusive, must respect the norms of **international negotiations**, and must reaffirm the multilateral approach -- Woodrow Wilson's

approach, firmly grounded in international institutions, treaties, rules, and norms of appropriate behaviour.

----**"International" in the context of global arms reductions**

**Disarmament Intelligence Review 97** [Disarmament Intelligence Review, 1997 NPT Briefing 3: Nuclear Disarmament, pg. [http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/1997prepcom/npt97\\_acro\\_pc3.htm](http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/1997prepcom/npt97_acro_pc3.htm)]

South Africa reiterated its concerns about the proliferation risks of NATO expansion, which prompted vehement opposition from Britain, France and the United States. They considered it irrelevant to the NPT and indignantly denied that the transfer of nuclear weapons among NATO members might violate the Treaty's articles I and II. In their lengthy statements, the three western nuclear powers listed the ways in which they had reduced their arsenals, curtailed fissile material production and so on. In response to arguments from South Africa, Canada and others that all five should engage in nuclear arms reduction talks, Britain repeated its version of the 'Chinese thesis', that when the US and Russian arsenals were in the hundreds, the UK would be prepared to join talks on nuclear disarmament. France said that its 'participation in international negotiations on nuclear arsenals is not relevant now' and quoted President Chirac regarding France's deterrent capacity compared with that of Russia and the United States.

---**In the context of negotiations over nuclear issues**

**Rizvi 06** [Haider Rizvi, "What to Do With the World's Nuclear Arsenal," Inter Press Service, Published on Saturday, October 21, 2006, pg. <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/1021-03.htm>.]

"North Koreans are correct when they say they are facing nuclear threats," John Burroughs, director of the New York-based Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, told IPS. In condemning North Korea's test, U.S. President George W. Bush told Japan and North Korea that the U.S. "will meet the full range of our deterrent and security commitments". Burroughs, a longtime observer of international negotiations on nuclear issues, criticised Pyongyang's decision to test a nuclear device, but added that "nobody should be surprised" to learn that this was in reaction to the Bush's 2001 nuclear review policy.

#### ---Context of disarmament

**Ingram 06** - Senior Analyst @ British American Security Information Council [Paul Ingram, "Trident: Do we really need to make the decision now?," BASIC Special Briefing, 25 July 2006, pg. <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/SB060725.pdf>]

Linked to this, one of the key reasons given by some to retain (and replace) the UK nuclear deterrent is to enter **international negotiations** from a position of strength. Delay, however, would enable the UK to seriously initiate high profile **international negotiations** towards further nuclear disarmament with a view to influencing other recognised and unrecognised nuclear weapon states - and to do so before investing heavily in a replacement system.

#### **International negotiations is between countries**

ChangingMinds.org ["International negotiations," pg. [http://changingminds.org/disciplines/negotiation/styles/international\\_negotiation.htm](http://changingminds.org/disciplines/negotiation/styles/international_negotiation.htm)]

International negotiation is as it says: inter-national. It is about negotiation between countries. International negotiation occurs all the time between governments and is the main subject of this page. It also happens between individuals and companies, where the traps and tricks of cross-border negotiation can ensnare even the most experienced home-country negotiators.

#### ---Expert using the term in disarmament and nonproliferation context

**Nikitin NO DATE** – Masters in International Policy Studies and Certificates in both Nonproliferation Studies and Conflict Resolution from the James Martin Center For Nonproliferation Studies [Mary Beth Nikitin, "CNS Alumni: Alumni Share CNS Experience" James Martin Center For Nonproliferation Studies, pg. <http://cns.miis.edu/alumni/nikitin.htm>.]

I am spending the summer of 2000 working for both the International Organizations and Newly Independent States (NIS) Nonproliferation Projects at CNS. I am updating a reference work called the "Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes," which documents the changing membership and policies of international treaties and organizations devoted to nonproliferation and disarmament. For the NIS Project, I update the CNS database with regard to export control legislation in Kazakhstan. Students who work on the database read news articles or legislation and abstract the important information for entry into the database. This database is subscribed to by research organizations, international organizations, and government agencies worldwide.

I will graduate in December 2000 with a Masters in International Policy Studies and Certificates in both Nonproliferation Studies and Conflict Resolution. After graduation, I will search for a job in the **nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation field, hopefully involving international negotiations.** My internship and simulation classes exposed me to the dynamics of multilateral negotiations, important to understanding the progress made on disarmament issues.

## Question 5: Initiatives—Still Working

*Initiatives is better than policies.*

**Typically policy is larger and initiatives would be things that reduce and restrict etc. this ev. uses both in context:**

Jonathan Medalia, 2004 (CRS Report for Congress,  
<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32130.pdf>)

Accordingly, the FY2004 request included **four nuclear weapon initiatives:** (1) rescinding the ban that Congress imposed in 1993 on R&D on low-yield nuclear weapons; (2) \$6 million for the Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI) to begin certain studies of weapon-related science and technology; (3) \$15 million to continue a study of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), in which an existing bomb would be converted into a weapon able to penetrate into the ground before detonating to improve its ability to destroy buried targets; and (4) \$25 million to enable the United States to conduct a nuclear test within 18 months of a presidential order to test, and for related purposes, as compared with the current 24-36 month time that was set shortly after the end of the Cold War.

Congress acted on these requests in the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136), and acted on the latter three in the FY2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-137). For FY2005, the Administration requests \$9.0 million for ACI, \$27.6 million for RNEP, and \$30.0 million for improving nuclear test readiness. These initiatives are controversial. Supporters claim that the first three initiatives would enhance deterrence, thereby reducing the risk of war, and that some weapons that might result from the initiatives could enable the United States to destroy key targets in nations that may pose a threat. Critics are concerned that these initiatives would lead to nuclear testing, increase the risk of nuclear proliferation, and make U.S. use of nuclear weapons more likely. Regarding enhanced test readiness, the Administration argues that nuclear testing might be needed, for example, to check fixes to weapon types with defects, and that 24 to 36 months is too long to wait; critics are concerned that shortening the time to test could signal a U.S. intent to test, and that renewed testing could lead to a renewed interest in testing by other nations. This report provides the **policy context** for the four initiatives. For each, it then presents a description, history, FY2004 legislative actions, the FY2005 request (for all but low-yield R&D), and issues for Congress. It is designed for those who want a detailed introduction to the debate, those seeking arguments and counterarguments, and those looking for answers to specific questions. It will track **congressional and executive actions on these initiatives** through updates as developments warrant.

### *Card on initiatives –defines specific proposals and includes the possibility of Russia & China*

**Shanebrook, 1999** (Summer, [http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs\\_all.jsp?arnumber=769297](http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=769297))  
The world now stands at a precarious nuclear fork in the road with the following characteristics: the Nuclear Left Path is characterized by continued vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons with the danger being that any nation (or terrorist group) that wants such weapons, and can afford them, will eventually secure them; the Nuclear Right Path prohibits all nuclear weapons and leads ideally to global nuclear disarmament where the threat of nuclear war is minimized. The article is concerned with several initiatives that could be taken in order to follow the Nuclear Right Path and perhaps achieve global nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Right Path requires a commitment of leadership from the US to vigorously promote new initiatives that seek to reduce, and perhaps totally eliminate, all nuclear weapons from Earth. These include, but are not limited, to the following: multilateral, phased reductions in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems; complete cessation of all flight tests of long-range missiles; a global nuclear warhead dismantlement plan with effective economic incentives; a firm commitment from all nations to stop producing missile materials for nuclear weapons. Besides Russia, the key nation in future negotiations to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals is China which faces unique challenges in providing for its burgeoning population and who stands today at the threshold of economic superpower status

### *Reciprocal cuts are “initiatives”*

Daryl **Kimball, 2006** (March, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pnig lance>)  
Near the Cold War’s end, leaders in Washington and Moscow made reciprocal unilateral pledges to substantially limit and reduce their nuclear weaponry, most notably their tactical or “battlefield” nuclear weapons, such as nuclear artillery shells.[1] President George H. W. Bush initiated these commitments, collectively known as the **Presidential Nuclear Initiatives** (PNIs), in September 1991 in recognition of the break up of the Eastern bloc and out of concern for the Kremlin’s ability to maintain control of its vast nuclear arsenal as political changes swept the Soviet Union.

## Question 6: Why is this resolution different from the other resolutions?

### 1) *It restricts—*

All the approaches but this one call for a substantial change. We feel restrict is much stronger because it creates a numerical limit. This creates a binding limit—which other resolutions do not necessarily do.

### 2) *It reduces—*

other verb stems are substantially change—this guarantees a reduction in role, size or mission.

### 3) *The mission and role cards create great T defenses—*

The AFF can read those cards and get a long way in specific T debates. Well rooted in the literature.

### 4) *It does not necessarily allow the FMCT or scientific approaches—*

voters may decide that those approaches make the topic too broad, or have concerns about debating the fuel for nuclear weapons.

### 5) *People may like the cases that are allowed by this approach more.*

The “posture” debates may be esoteric and removed from the public debate on deterrence. I’m reminded by Mitchell’s pointing out that the topic paper was calling for a more public discussion of nuclear weapons:

Josiane Gabel, 2005 (The Role of U.S. Nuclear

Weapons after September 11, [http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter\\_gabel.pdf](http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_gabel.pdf))

Since the dramatic September 11 terrorist attacks, the public’s overwhelming attention to security has resulted in considerable research on the threats of the new strategic era. The debate that followed the Bush administration’s 2001 NPR offered hope that recognition of the new challenges would include a discussion on **adapting the country’s nuclear posture**. Indeed, the controversy surrounding the NPR produced a remarkable increase in the volume of literature on the mission of nuclear weapons. Still, some experts commented that the profound implications of the NPR’s plans amounted to a “quiet revolution” in the nuclear strategy of the United States, but **the level of public debate does not reflect such a change**. In fact, the controversy following the NPR focused on a somewhat narrow set of implications, for example, **how robust nuclear earth penetrators might affect proliferation**, the nuclear testing moratorium, and the **nuclear threshold**. The literature would have benefited from addressing in greater depth the issue underlying the proposals contained in the NPR: **the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence hinges on the credibility of the retaliatory threat**, an aspect that poses an obvious problem in today’s context. Is the U.S. nuclear posture **still credible** in the eyes of adversaries that are diverse, quickly evolving, and at times poorly understood?

## Appendix: List of Roles/Missions

### List of Roles:

The Union of Concerned Scientists proposes 10 different policies that could “drastically reduce the role” that nuclear weapons play.

To prevent more nations—and eventually terrorists—from acquiring nuclear weapons, **the United States should drastically reduce the role that nuclear weapons play in its security policies.** Toward True Security outlines 10 unilateral steps the next president should take to transform U.S. nuclear policy, which would strengthen national security and put the world on a path to eventually banning nuclear weapons. **By taking this leadership role, the United States would also demonstrate to the rest of the world that it is serious about addressing what remains one of the gravest threats to human civilization.**

The United States need not wait for bilateral or multilateral agreements; it **should take unilateral steps to begin the process.** These steps would make the United States safer, whether or not the eventual goal of a worldwide ban is ever achieved. The greatest nuclear dangers to the United States are an accidental, unauthorized or mistaken Russian nuclear attack, the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorists. U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the report concludes, fails to adequately address these risks and too often exacerbates them.

By taking these 10 unilateral steps, **the next president would bring U.S. nuclear weapons policy into line with today’s political realities, and demonstrate to the rest of the world that the United States is serious about addressing what remains one of the gravest threats to human civilization.**

- 1. Declare that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use of nuclear weapons by another country.** Making it clear that the United States will not use nuclear weapons first would reduce the incentive for other nations to acquire these weapons to deter a potential U.S. first strike.
- 2. Reject rapid-launch options by changing U.S. deployment practices to allow the launch of nuclear forces within days instead of minutes.** Increasing the amount of time required to launch U.S. weapons would ease Russian concerns about the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons and in turn give it the incentive to take its weapons off alert, reducing the risk of an accidental or unauthorized Russian launch on the United States.
- 3. Eliminate preset targeting plans, and replace them with the capability to promptly develop a response tailored to the situation if nuclear weapons are used against the United States, its armed forces, or its allies.**
- 4. Promptly and unilaterally reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal to no more than 1,000 warheads, including deployed and reserve warheads.** There is no plausible threat that justifies maintaining more than a few hundred survivable nuclear weapons, and no reason to link the size of U.S. nuclear forces to those of any other country. **The United States would declare all warheads above this level to be in excess of its military needs, move them into storage, begin dismantling them in a manner transparent to the international community, and begin disposing—under international safeguards—of all plutonium and highly enriched uranium beyond that required to maintain these 1,000 warheads.** By making the end point of this dismantlement process dependent on Russia’s response, the United States would encourage Russia to reciprocate.
- 5. Halt all** programs for developing and deploying new nuclear weapons, including the proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead.
- 6. Promptly and unilaterally retire all U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons, dismantling them in a transparent manner, and take steps to induce Russia to do the same.**
- 7. Announce a U.S. commitment to reducing its number of nuclear weapons further, on a negotiated and verified bilateral or multilateral basis.**
- 8. Commit to not resume nuclear testing, and work with the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.**
- 9. Halt further deployment of the Ground-Based Missile Defense system, and drop any plans for space-based missile defense.** The deployment of a U.S. missile defense system that Russia or China believed could intercept a significant portion of its survivable long-range missile forces would be an obstacle to deep nuclear cuts. A U.S. missile defense system could also trigger reactions by these nations that would result in a net decrease in U.S. security.
- 10. Reaffirm the U.S. commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament, and present a specific plan for moving toward that goal, in recognition of the fact that a universal and verifiable prohibition on nuclear weapons would enhance both national and international security.** (Union of Concerned Scientists, webpage describing “Toward True Security 2008,” February 2008, [http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear\\_weapons\\_and\\_global\\_security/nuclear\\_weapons/policy\\_issues/toward-true-security-ten.html](http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/nuclear_weapons/policy_issues/toward-true-security-ten.html), accessed 5-30-09.)

### ***List of Missions***

**Nuclear Missions**<sup>12</sup> 1. Survive and fire back after nuclear attack against homeland (for retaliation/deterrence) 2. Survive and fire back after nuclear attack against allies (for retaliation/deterrence/assurance) 3. Survive and fire back after chem/bio attack against homeland (for retaliation/deterrence) 4. Survive and fire back after chem/bio attack against allies (for assurance/retaliation/deterrence) 5. Survive and fire back after CBW use in military theater 6. Deploying nuclear weapons to attack enemy nuclear weapons to increase their vulnerability, decreasing their value (to discourage their development in the first place) 7. Deploying nuclear weapons to attack enemy chem/bio weapons to increase their vulnerability, decreasing their value (to discourage their development in the first place) 8. Damage limitation attacks against nuclear weapons in military theater 9. Damage limitation attacks against CB weapons in military theater 10. Damage limitation attacks against Russian/Chinese central systems 11. Ready to inflict damage after regional conventional attacks (or to deter such attacks) 12. Overawe potential rivals 13. Provide virtual power 14. Fight regional wars 15. Apply shock to terminate a regional conventional war