

## A Nuclear Arms Agreement With China

This wording would include affs that –

### Offer a QPQ to induce Chinese compliance with the FCMT

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Christopher, Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, January/ February,  
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\\_01-02/china\\_us\\_dangerous\\_dynamism](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/china_us_dangerous_dynamism)

A global approach to nonproliferation will fail without China's active support. Bush administration policies have eroded the current system, already under stress due to globalization and the end of the Cold War. The U.S.-Indian deal on nuclear energy was highly salient for China because of its rivalry with India and friendship with Pakistan. In the North Korean case, inspections may well move forward on a bilateral basis rather than through existing global fora.

The United States can take steps to begin to repair this damage, regaining the initiative on the global nonproliferation regime. Quick ratification of the CTBT will send a positive signal. **Reinvigorated diplomacy on a treaty cutting off the production of fissile material for weapons might do so as well.** On that issue, however, China's objections need to be taken seriously. China's stockpile of fissile material is a miniscule fraction of that of the United States. **Freezing that ratio in place in perpetuity is something China would only concede in response to other inducements.** These should be discussed frankly.

Beyond these small-scale steps and more fundamentally, a new nonproliferation architecture is needed. China must be integrally involved in its design. In the wake of the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal and with failures to stop proliferation in North Korea, it is unclear if the current hodgepodge of overlapping institutions (nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG], etc.) will continue to form the basis of the global approach to containing proliferation. As new global approaches are developed, it should be recognized that China's participation in the World Trade Organization and in the recent G-20 meetings on the financial crisis has generally been responsible, if not entirely to U.S. liking. **In the current global context, the United States cannot dictate the design of that architecture; Beijing, as well as others, must play a constitutive role.**

### Offer a NFU pledge as part of a US-Sino confidence building measure

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Deepening engagement on nuclear and nuclear-related strategic issues would be constructive in this regard. **Bilateral confidence measures between China and the United States could be discussed, particularly in the area of declaratory policy. The Chinese have often asked why the United States is unwilling to offer a no-first-use pledge.** A blanket no-first-use pledge might undermine U.S. credibility in other regions. Yet, a pledge narrowly confined to the Chinese-U.S. arena would seem to have fewer costs. What benefits would the United States garner from such a pledge from Beijing? Similarly, would Beijing view positively a definitive statement that the United States accepts the existence of a Chinese secure second-strike capability? For what might the United States hope in return? These questions remain unanswered.

Affs that may not be viable under this wording would –

### Engage in quantitative, binding arms reductions negotiations with China

**Dunn** - Senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp, served as assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and ambassador for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the Reagan administration – ‘9

**Lewis**, Reshaping Strategic Relationships: Expanding the Arms Control Toolbox, May,  
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\\_5/Dunn](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/Dunn)

The time is not ripe for traditional bilateral arms control negotiations aimed at legally binding, verifiable agreements between Beijing and Washington, let alone trilateral negotiations involving Moscow. U.S. officials will be absorbed over the coming year with negotiating a follow-on to START, while outside experts are only beginning to think beyond a bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control process. Chinese officials continue to assert that the United States and Russia bear the immediate burden for nuclear disarmament, while opposing the type of hard nuclear transparency that would be essential for formal treaty negotiations. The eventual ripeness of legally binding arms control agreements also will depend on pursuing negotiations cooperatively rather than in the very adversarial style that characterized much of the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian arms control experience.

### More evidence

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**Christopher**, Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, January/ February,  
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There is no simple solution for this set of problems. The differences in national interests held by Beijing and Washington are not likely to be materially affected by Barack Obama's inauguration as president. That said, the unilateralist and anti-institutional approach to arms control that characterized the Bush administration is likely to wane. The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms control agreements for two reasons: doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U.S. relationship with the Cold War standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. arsenal remains much larger than China's. Yet, it is wrong to expect such views to hold in perpetuity. Beijing's emphasis on ambiguity about its arsenal, which is incompatible with serious negotiations over arms control, is not a cultural predisposition toward "strategic deception" any more than was the Soviet Union's early Cold War emphasis on secrecy. Instead, these are rational strategies when nuclear arsenals are small. Intrusive verification eventually became conceivable even to hard-line Soviet leaders. Certainly, economic exhaustion contributed to that change, but so too did fundamental changes in Soviet threat perceptions.[4] Although the former seems unlikely in China in the near term, the latter is something that might be fomented.

## **The asymmetric relationship between the US and Chinese arsenals may even generate Chinese resistance to transparency and verification**

**Rickard – Analyst, Strategic Insight, Produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School – ‘8**

James, Sun Tzu, Nuclear Weapons and China's Grand Strategy, July,  
<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Jul/rickardJul08.asp#reference>

Having presented three cases in which the CMC may consider abrogating its NFU pledge, the composition of their nuclear deterrent forces must be considered to understand the current and possible future trajectory of their grand strategy. The discussion above showed that China possesses a modest nuclear arsenal compared to those of the United States and Russia, although to put things in proper perspective, the Chinese may boast the world's third largest inventory of nuclear weapons. The CMC knows that it cannot beat the United States in an all out nuclear exchange. However, China's leaders have thought about how to successfully defeat the United States in their "The Inferior Defeats the Superior" strategy.[81] They explain details of their strategy in Coercive Deterrence as they list their weaknesses and strengths: "the operational radius of the Chinese aviation force is limited, and the Navy does not have big carriers . . . a missile weapon force . . . with strong defense capability and wide range flexible firepower, plays a crucial military deterrence role." [82] The Coercive Deterrence authors state that: "Military deterrence by missile forces is a confrontation of strength and determination, as well as a contest of stratagem and wisdom." [83] They stress the virtues of denial and deception:

First, combine "keeping" and "leaking" secrets to let the other side know that we have strong deterrence forces, but not the specific real situation of our forces. Secondly, reasonably arrange the deployment of the real and unreal forces by placing the real forces in false forces and vice versa, and mixing the real and false forces, as well as blending true and false targets, true and false positions, true and false intelligence, and true and false action so that the enemy will have a hard time to make decision and out [sic, NB: probably a typo and should be: our] side will achieve the effect of "winning by deterrence." [84]

Alastair Johnston focused on the "Chineseness" of China's deterrence strategy based on minimalism, ambiguity, flexibility and patience. [85] The Chinese have attempted to hide their weaknesses while they have flaunted their strengths. This demonstrates Sun Tzu's arts of war in action. [86]

## **This will implicate bilateral negotiations on nuclear forces and declaratory policy**

**Rickard – Analyst, Strategic Insight, Produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School – ‘8**

James, Sun Tzu, Nuclear Weapons and China's Grand Strategy, July,  
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One reads of national nuclear strategies, such as the U.S.' Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), which are highly classified and only individuals requiring access and possessing a need-to-know are aware of the target sets and strike options contained therein. It is self evident that such information be kept from the ken of potential adversaries. Does one ever read about an equivalent Chinese 'SIOP'? One thinks not. Additionally, China's nuclear declaratory policy and its actual employment strategy may not necessarily overlap during a real-world contingency, or when in extremis. Deeds may belie words. This controversial topic will be discussed later in the paper.

Concomitantly, concerning the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese grand strategy, Ronald N. Montaperto wrote:

. . . it is not in China's strategic interest to be transparent about most aspects of its nuclear posture and strategy. No amount of strategic dialogue is likely to be sufficient by itself to overcome Beijing's incentives to remain as opaque as possible. This is likely to be a major issue in future development of bilateral relations. [6]

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**How other areas of the wording would create discussions over China's nuclear arsenal –**

### **CTBT would reinvigorate bilateral negotiations over arms control**

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Other steps could move beyond diplomacy alone. Detailed discussions with China of U.S. warhead modernization plans that take Chinese concerns seriously could be constructive. Similarly, a reinvigorated U.S. effort to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would hint at a broader return to the commitment toward multilateral arms control that characterized U.S. foreign policy under both parties throughout the Cold War. Such reinvigoration of the broader regime is critical to making progress on narrowly bilateral issues as that regime provides a global context in which Beijing views the bilateral relationship. Finally, are there aspects of the U.S. modernization program, for instance, highly accurate guidance systems on Trident II warheads, that Washington and Omaha might be willing to forgo in exchange for tacit restraint in other areas from Beijing? Precisely these sorts of trades were at the heart of important arms control agreements between the Soviets and the United States in the Cold War. Although such steps are premature today, understanding the possible parameters of such exchanges is useful for laying the groundwork for future discussions.

### **A unilateral NFU pledge would create Chinese constraint on numerous aspects of its arsenal**

**Kristensen et al – Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists - April '9  
Hans, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists and the NRDC**

There is no question that bringing the next tier of nuclear powers, probably China, Britain, and France, into arms reduction negotiations will be complex and challenging, but management of the Chinese threat in particular will be easier without their fearing a disarming first strike. The Chinese are in the difficult position of currently seeing such a threat from both the United States and the Russians, and all sides have clear benefits from curtailing the nuclear mission. An American focus on retaliation alone will allow negotiation of changes in the Russian force structure and, with both nuclear superpower arsenals being less offensively-oriented, Chinese constraint on missile numbers, payload, and MIRVing will be easier.

### **Unilateral targeting changes would spur Chinese arms reductions and prevent reversal of its NFU pledge**

**Kristensen et al – Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists - April '9  
Hans, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists and the NRDC**

If the United States abandons its counterforce capability under a minimal deterrence policy, changes in Russian and Chinese arsenal size and deployment could result. The Russians could make some immediate changes in response. For example, since they are as worried about responding disastrously to a false warning of attack as the United States is, they could adjust their threshold for launch to reflect their altered perception of the threat. China, likewise, might, if the United States and Russia relaxed their postures, be less inclined to modify its nuclear doctrine, a concern stated repeatedly by the Pentagon.<sup>27</sup> Changes in the Russian and Chinese nuclear forces would not be automatic, of course. We believe, however, that moving away from counterforce will more importantly open opportunities for negotiated symmetric reductions in the forces of all sides. By abandoning counterforce capability against Russia, the United States might be able to negotiate reductions in Russian forces down to the levels that they would have after a U.S. counterforce first strike, to the clear security advantage of both.