

The question put to me was whether the core elements of the topic require some ability for the affirmative to negotiate/consult with other nations. The answer is mixed. There are some plans that can be done unilaterally with ease. Ratifying the CTBT or de-alerting nuclear warheads fall within this camp. Others require international cooperation. For example, while it is possible for an affirmative to defend U.S. unilateral disarmament, there is a lot more literature on global disarmament, which requires consultation and negotiation. Similarly, any of the potential treaties except for the CTBT (START, any of the potential fissile material treaties, many of the treaties listed in Shalmon et al.'s original paper) obviously require negotiation/consultation. Finally, there are several cases that COULD be done unilaterally, but it is hard to see anyone CHOOSING to run those cases without some form of consultation power. The clearest examples are Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and No First Use (NFU). Our forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons are in Europe, and are at the cornerstone of our NATO commitments. Finding advocates to remove those weapons WITHOUT consulting NATO (which also covers our European allies since they are in NATO) will be very difficult. (It is always possible to find people who neglect to mention things, but finding authors who say, "yes, pull them out without discussing it first" seems nearly impossible.) Similarly, huge parts of our first use threats are to defend our allies in Europe from Russia and to defend our Asian allies from China and North Korea. Adopting a NFU policy WITHOUT consulting with the allies we have promised to protect with those weapons is absurd. The solvency authors assume we negotiate.

CTBT

This is a unilateral step for the affirmative. The treaty requires ratification by 10 other nations to go into force. We signed it, submitted it for ratification in 1999, and after the Senate rejected it, we never resubmitted. Some advantages would come from US action, others may come from the treaty eventually coming into force, but a US signature would all but guarantee that. Absent a US signature, the treaty will likely collapse.

Aboul-Enein 2009 (Sameh, deputy head of mission of Egypt to the United Kingdom) In *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgf 5/18/09

Although the United States has not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992, the treaty has not been put to the Senate for consideration since it was last rejected in October 1999.⁶ If the United States, with its huge nuclear arsenal, does not commit to the treaty, other states may start to question their own involvement. Indeed, some disquiet has already emerged concerning the financial demands of treaty regime.

De-Alert

This one can be done unilaterally. It only takes an executive order. It might hurt allies perceptions of deterrence, but given that we can “re-alert” as easily as we de-alerted, the affirmative has a fighting chance against that DA even without any form of consultation.

Krieger & Ong 2002 (David & Carah, April) Waging Peace
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/04/00_krieger_de-alert.htm /bgb 6/3/9

De-alerting can be accomplished in a matter of weeks without negotiating or ratifying a treaty. It can be done by a simple executive order to stand down nuclear forces. In 1991, then US President George H. W. Bush took the bold step of removing hundreds of US nuclear weapons from high-alert status, and in response, Mikhail Gorbachev did the same with hundreds of Soviet nuclear weapons. It is time for similar courageous leadership to finish the process started Presidents Bush and Gorbachev.

With that said, Shalmon et al., have several good cards in his original wording paper that talk about the need for enhanced verification processes and inspections to ensure de-alerting. Such steps would require negotiation/consultation.

Stockpile Reductions

There is debate over whether or not the US (or anyone) should pursue a short term abolition of nuclear weapons. But there are clear steps, like stockpile reductions, that can be unilaterally taken by the US and that will generate some advantages.

Doyle 2009 (James E., Nuclear Nonproliferation Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory) In Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

This is a theme that is carried throughout the essay. The premise is that no reasonable mind would proceed toward nuclear disarmament unless the nature of the “political reality” were first changed. This is where the essay’s commitment to predict what future conditions might be necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons becomes obstructionist. The most important point is that there are strong practical reasons for taking steps now to reduce the risks created by the existence of nuclear arms. These steps are in the national security interests of many states and of the United States and Europe in particular. They may be consistent with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and, indeed, significantly increase the likelihood of achieving that goal, but they are not dependent upon achieving it. To pursue these objectives, addressed in detail below, there is no need to change the nature of politics or military relations. To the contrary, the pursuit of international security and well-being would be advanced by immediately taking some specific steps short of nuclear abolition.

Abolition

Although there will clearly be literature supporting unilateral disarmament in some circles, there will not be much in the traditional policy realm. Almost all of those arguments will assume multilateral efforts, although US leadership will be “key” to some, and that leadership may be spurred by unilateral actions. For example, The Nuclear Peace Foundation has recently put out a 17 year plan to achieve global nuclear abolition.

Krieger, May 21, 2009 (David, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation)

http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/05/21_krieger_roadmap_abolition.php?krieger/bgb/6/3/9

President Obama and others have suggested that the path to a world free of nuclear weapons could be a long one, beyond his own life. This is possible, but it could also happen much more rapidly with strong political will and leadership from the United States. The Roadmap proposed below suggests that the goal could be achieved within a timeframe of 10 to 17 years, that is, between 2019 and 2026. This is a goal that the United States cannot achieve alone, but that cannot be achieved without the United States. President Obama has provided a vision and the political will to begin the process in a serious way. He has made possible what has seemed impossible.

If you want to see all 30 steps he outlines (and how many of them require at least US-Russian negotiation, while many of them require global discussions), I direct you to the link. However, the verification debate will likely require affirmatives to engage all nuclear nations (not just nuclear weapons nations) at some level.

Perkovich & Acton 2009 (George, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & James, associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the CEIP) *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

The need for non-nuclear-weapons states to join a debate over the details of nuclear disarmament is great. The global diffusion of the technology and know-how to produce fissile materials threatens to overwhelm the existing regime to prevent the ‘diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons’.⁶ Fear of nuclear proliferation is motivating some nuclear-weapons states to take nuclear disarmament more seriously,⁷ but neither non-proliferation nor the abolition of nuclear weapons can be achieved without the active cooperation of non-nuclear-weapons states. Nuclear abolition would require much more than the dismantling of all nuclear weapons in the nine states that now possess them. To make abolition feasible and to enable the detection of rearmament, all states that possess nuclear reactors, uranium-enrichment plants, plutonium reprocessing facilities, uranium reserves or even transshipment ports would have to accept more intrusive control measures and inspection procedures than they do today. To build confidence that an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons would be enforced, all states would need to demonstrate a willingness to enforce international rules with greater alacrity and robustness than has been historically normal.

Brent Brossmann
Relationship of Core Ground to Negotiations

As for leadership, there are clearly arguments for US-Russian leadership.

Zedillo 2009 (Ernesto, director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization; professor at Yale University and former president of Mexico) In *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

The United States and Russia have not only the capacity but also a special responsibility to play this role. The nuclear giants have the responsibility to move first once again toward nuclear disarmament, by putting forward initiatives for enhancing cooperation and committing resources. And when this happens, international leadership will emerge, not as an imposition but as a result of the assumption of responsibility. With this type of leadership, the United States and Russia could then persuade the other nuclear powers to join them and make practically unavoidable the engagement of the non-nuclear-weapon states in the construction of the new nuclear order that Perkovich and Acton have so ably depicted.

Or, maybe we need China, too:

Perkovich & Acton 2009 (George, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & James, associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the CEIP) *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

These are among the issues that would need to be seriously addressed in any deliberations on whether and how to proceed with the total elimination of nuclear weapons and enforce security in a world without them. It is difficult to imagine China, Russia, France, the UK and the US genuinely embarking on a course of nuclear disarmament in the absence of a significant reconciliation of their interests and approaches to regional and global security. If they were willing and able to achieve such reconciliation, enforcement would be much more imaginable. A first-order task, then, is for Beijing, Moscow and Washington to begin discussions of the conditions they think are necessary to establish to begin a genuine transition to a nuclear-weapons-free world. Other states can and should press these three to accept this responsibility.

A coalition, led by the US, could change everything:

Doyle 2009 (James E., Nuclear Nonproliferation Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory) In *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

The power of leadership and diplomatic coercion that could be brought to bear by a coalition of powerful states should not be underestimated. One might look at the recent U.S. initiative to exempt India from non-proliferation export controls as an example of how decades of consistent policy by many states can be transformed in a very short time. Once the United States defined the nuclear trade exemption for India to be in its interest, it not only changed more than thirty years of American policy and law, but it also successfully lobbied dozens of other countries to accept a

new approach to India. A similar dynamic might make the transformation of nuclear forces and postures more attainable than many might think. Many states might be willing to begin implementing steps toward an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons without absolute confidence that it would be enforced. After all, the vast majority of nations do not possess or seek nuclear weapons. They are likely to support a serious experiment at nuclear disarmament even if it is ultimately unsuccessful. The only way to know is to try.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Although the weapons belong to the United States, they are on European soil, they represent a commitment to Europe, and they are considered a cornerstone of our NATO relationship. Requiring an affirmative to bring them home without discussing it with NATO (which would include the relevant European states) seems like a really bad idea. The distinction that Shalmon et al. draw between negative and positive assurances is important. It probably should NOT be affirmative ground to create a NEW positive assurance to protect. However, negotiating to provide the same level of protection with conventional means that we currently provide with nuclear warheads seems essential if we want to see anyone run NFU or TNW cases.

Aboul-Enein 2009 (Sameh, deputy head of mission of Egypt to the United Kingdom) In Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

The United States, with NATO's agreement, should withdraw its estimated 240 tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, while Russia should withdraw its tactical weapons from operational deployment and place them in secure storage until they are abolished. In addition, the two countries should extend START I, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, to ensure that verification measures remain in force.

There are even cards that talk about NATO's unilateral action to remove US weapons from Europe. The approach theoretically denies US-Russian negotiations, but simply assumes that any TNW removal is within the realm of NATO, not the US.

Kulesa March 2009 (Łukasz, The Polish Institute of International Affairs)
www.cceol.com/asp/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=e1879d71b5ae4d5cb549eb27305896dd /bgb 6/4/9

Should NATO engage Russia as a part of the process of removing US nuclear weapons from Europe? The proponents of a "new opening" argue that such a withdrawal would alleviate Russian concerns about US and NATO intentions, and, in return, Russia might be willing to reduce the number of its tactical weapons, guarantee greater transparency, provide credible assurances that its arsenal is well secured, and also possibly agree to remove weapons from those regions bordering NATO countries. This kind of bargain may look attractive at first sight, however, the fundamental decisions concerning the future of US nuclear weapons in Europe can and should be taken by NATO unilaterally. Russia may be invited to follow the process with its own reductions, but to make progress conditional on Moscow's reciprocity would be a mistake.

No First Use

A NFU pledge can be made in a variety of ways, including a unilateral declaration.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) 2008

<http://www.ctbto.org/glossary/?letter=n&cHash=e9063b15fe/bgb/6/3/9>

No First Use

A pledge on the part of a nuclear weapons state not to be the first party to use nuclear weapons in a conflict or crisis. No-first-use guarantees may be made in unilateral statements, bilateral or multilateral agreements, or as part of a treaty creating a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

The problem is that adopting a unilateral NFU won't do us much good. The Soviet Union did it that way and nobody believed them. China and India have done it that way, and they have (generally) been believed, but they introduced NFU almost immediately after they became nuclear, have kept relatively small nuclear arsenals, and have openly pledged never to engage in an arms race, never to use nuclear weapons first, and to limit the creation of nuclear weapons to a second strike capability. The US has never taken any of those positions, so it is unlikely that a unilateral declaration would carry much weight.

Additionally, to be taken seriously, NFU would require a change in war plans and nuclear posture. This means we have to revamp NATO doctrine, for example.

Miller 2002 (Steven E., Director, International Security Program, Center for Science & International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard University) Pugwash Meeting no. 279 <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/miller.htm/bgb/6/1/9>

NFU cannot be real if militaries develop war plans that include, or even depend upon, the expectation of first-use of nuclear weapons. It has long been a commonplace to note the gap that often exists in nuclear powers between declaratory policy and operation policy. The Soviet Union's NFU pledge, for example, coexisted with war plans for a European war that called for substantial use of nuclear weapons from the outset of hostilities.²⁵ A genuine strategy of no-first use would need to be reflected in operational war plans. These would have to assume an entirely non-nuclear character and to extirpate all scenarios in which recourse is made to the first use of nuclear weapons.

Eradicating the idea that nuclear first use is an option would have enormous implications. It would alter the expectations of politicians and commanders. It would (or should) influence military investment decisions - more conventional capability may be necessary, for example.²⁶ It could affect public articulations of defense policy and military doctrine.

In the Soviet period, Moscow's NFU pledge was undermined by a profusion of military writings that emphasized nuclear preemption and warfighting and otherwise were in tension with NFU. But a genuine NFU strategy would need to harmonize doctrinal expositions and political explanations of defense policy with the constraints of the NFU commitment. Changes in public rhetoric alone will not be sufficient to convince the world that a NFU strategy is firmly in place. But they could help send the message that NFU was being taken seriously. NATO presently proclaims at every occasion that nuclear weapons are essential and that nuclear first-use is an integral component of alliance military strategy. If NATO instead were to proclaim that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to most of the alliance's security needs and that it could not envision circumstances in which it would use nuclear weapons first, this would certainly set a very different tone.

The most recent solvency advocate is Scott Sagan, who's article was just published in *Survival*. He is very clear that the US needs to consult with our allies before adopting NFU – which he strongly supports.

Sagan, June 2009 (Scott, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation) *Survival* | vol. 51 no. 3 | June–July 2009 | pp. 163–182 /bgb /5/28/09

There were strong and obvious reasons why Washington maintained and advertised a range of first-use options throughout the Cold War: NATO faced a massive conventional threat from the Warsaw Pact and the United States and its allies in East Asia were confronted by the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and North Korea. But these options are no longer necessary. Examination of the costs and benefits suggests that the United States should, **after appropriate consultation with allies**, move toward adopting a nuclear-weapons no-first-use declaratory policy by stating that 'the role of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces, and to be able respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options, if necessary, in the event that deterrence fails'.

Sagan is clear that we must renegotiate our deterrence commitments in order to adopt NFU.

Sagan, June 2009 (Scott, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation) *Survival* | vol. 51 no. 3 | June–July 2009 | pp. 163–182 /bgb /5/28/09

Considerable diplomatic consultation would need to take place within NATO and with key US allies in East Asia to ensure that all parties understand that commitments to defend them would be maintained, indeed might be made even more credible, by emphasising conventional responses to conventional attacks and nuclear retaliation only in the event of a nuclear attack. It is worth noting that a group of former German leaders are on record as stating that 'a general non-first-use treaty between the nuclear-weapons states would be an urgently needed step' for progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.¹⁴ Those who argue against a US no-first-use doctrine on grounds that it would automatically undercut reassurance to all of those allies are not taking into account the views of those allies nor the positive diplomatic benefits that could result from changes in declaratory policy.

Ballistic Missile Defense

There are clear advocates for BMD as a means of allowing the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, it is also true that the US, China and Russia need to consult on strategic visions of BMD systems to accomplish that. First, the solvency card:

Perkovich & Acton 2009 (George, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & James, associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the CEIP) *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

Ballistic-missile defences will inescapably influence the prospects of further nuclear reductions and eventually of prohibiting nuclear weapons. If reliable testing convinces impartial observers that ballistic-missile defences would be highly effective in real-world scenarios, this technology could make nuclear disarmament more feasible, by insuring against the risk of cheating and nuclear threats involving low numbers of weapons. Effective missile defences could also reassure disarming nuclear states about the risk of conventional attack involving ballistic missiles. In each scenario, ballistic-missile defences could help both to counter an important threat and to deter it in the first place. (This would be true whether or not ballistic missiles were banned as part of a regime to eliminate nuclear weapons).

And now, they provide their need for consultation. The card hints at cooperation more than openly proclaims it, but it's fairly intuitive given the "shared conception" language.

Perkovich & Acton 2009 (George, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & James, associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the CEIP) *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Eds., Adelphi Paper 396. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf /bgb 5/18/09

However, as long as the US, Russia and China have no shared conception of whether and how they might regulate their competition in strategic weaponry, the deployment of ballistic-missile defences increases rather than decreases the salience of nuclear weapons. This is due to the risk that the possession of such defences might embolden a state to launch a nuclear or conventional first strike against an adversary's nuclear forces, in the belief that it could then use its ballistic-missile defences to block a retaliatory salvo from whatever forces survived the attack. Even if a state with such defences had no intention of launching any such first strike, other states could not be sure of this.

In conclusion, I think that "giving consultation / negotiation to the negative" kills a number of otherwise very good cases. Although I have some fears of what can be included in the affirmative "right to consult," there are a number of potential checks.

1. Literature – the topicality check seems to work here. If the affirmative finds on point evidence that we need to negotiate a particular deal or consult with a particular country in order to achieve a specific nuclear reduction, then it's probably worth debating. If not, the negative has topicality ground.
2. Binding consultation v. non-binding consultation. Negatives have been running that BINDING consultation is the key for years. This gives them a chance to prove it. If the ability to reject the plan is central, then a negative argument defending could be a round winner.
3. PICs – I personally despise PICs, but they are well entrenched. Affirmatives that get abusive with their negotiations may have those negotiations (or something else) removed via the PIC.

Brent Brossmann

Relationship of Core Ground to Negotiations

4. The rest of the plan. For example, there is a ton of evidence that the elimination of nuclear weapons would make the US much more power vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Whether you read “US will beef up conventional arms” links or just “absent nuclear weapons, there is zero check to US conventional power”, the hegemony links are going to be amazing. So, no matter what happens on consultation, the negative should have ample ground.
5. We’ve lived with this before. I can’t tell you how many plans I’ve heard that started with, “in consultation with all relevant actors, the United States Federal Government will . . .” I know that isn’t popular at the moment, but we’ve definitely survived it in the past.